Reassessment: Origin OUSD (1.85 → 2.05) - #434
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Refresh at block 25876180 (Aug 31, 2026). TVL $6.24M, down ~16% since the June assessment. Material findings: - ~54% of TVL is USDC lent against Origin's own OETH / superOETHb in Morpho markets whose oracles read Chainlink ETH/USD with no LST-specific feed. - The HyperEVM leg (~16.7% of TVL) sits in a MetaMorpho v1.1 vault whose owner is a single EOA, with curator() and guardian() unset and timelock() = 0 — an un-timelocked single-key path to $1.04M. - The Morpho legs are three vault layers deep on each of three chains; the Ethereum and Base stacks are curated by Yearn's Security multisig and a 2-of-3 curator Safe with 3-day timelocks. - The June report read withdrawalQueueMetadata() cumulative counters as a live backlog; actual outstanding demand is queued − claimed = 14 USDC. - The vault no longer uses an oracle (_deprecated_priceProvider) and has no rebaseThreshold; rebase is permissioned and rate-capped. Governance, roles, multisig thresholds, proxy implementations, and the mint whitelist are unchanged. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The Morpho curation layer under all three OUSD legs is Yearn's own, so it is not a third-party trust assumption for a Yearn allocation decision: - Ethereum: OUSD-V2 / OUSD-V1 owned by Yearn Security (4-of-7), curator Safe 0x90D0…6B51 (2-of-3), guardian set, 3-day timelock. - Base: OUSDb-V2 / OUSDb-V1 owned by 0xFEaE…E36F (4-of-8, signer set overlaps Yearn Security), same curator Safe, guardian set, 3-day timelock. - HyperEVM: both vaults deployed by 0xFc5F…C12B, which called createMetaMorpho and createVaultV2 and set feeRecipient() to the same Yearn curator Safe. The HyperEVM leg keeps a factual note and a monitoring item — EOA key, no guardian, timelock() = 0 — but is no longer scored as an external dependency or listed as a key risk. Also recorded that OUSDh-V2 has permanently abdicated setReceiveAssetsGate and setAdapterRegistry, so withdrawals cannot be gated. Bug bounty reconfirmed against the live Immunefi page: $1M max critical, 10% of economic damage, $50K floor, Safe Harbor, last updated Aug 4 2026. Asset count corrected 34 → 28; added payout track record (40 reports, $139.2K). Dependencies 3.5 → 3.0, Collateralization 3.0 → 2.5; final 2.17 → 2.05. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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ctmotox2
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Sep 18, 2026
| | Contract | Address | Role / Key facts | | ||
| |----------|---------|------------------| | ||
| | Cross-Chain Remote Strategy | [`0xE0228DB13F8C4Eb00fD1e08e076b09eF5cD0EA1e`](https://hyperevmscan.io/address/0xE0228DB13F8C4Eb00fD1e08e076b09eF5cD0EA1e) | Same address as the mainnet master; `governor()` = [`0x7712…1364`](https://hyperevmscan.io/address/0x77121911A387c9e4Eae46345E0f831A6da8a1364) | | ||
| | OUSD Vault V2 (Morpho Vault V2) | [`0xE90959cbE7E56b5eBFF9AD12de611A4976F2d2B1`](https://hyperevmscan.io/address/0xE90959cbE7E56b5eBFF9AD12de611A4976F2d2B1) | `OUSDh-V2`; owner = curator = Yearn deployer key [`0xFc5F…C12B`](https://hyperevmscan.io/address/0xFc5F89d29CCaa86e5410a7ad9D9d280d4455C12B); `setReceiveAssetsGate` and `setAdapterRegistry` permanently abdicated | |
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These role assertions are incorrect at the stated snapshot. OUSDh-V2 and OUSDh-V1 owner() = 0x518C…70149, a 4-of-7 Safe with the same signer set as Yearn Security; both vaults’ curator() = 0x90D0…6B51; OUSDh-V1 guardian() = 0x4FF1…971 and timelock() = 259,200 seconds. Please correct the control model and remove the EOA/zero-timelock assertions.
ctmotox2
reviewed
Sep 18, 2026
| #### Category 2: Centralization & Control Risks (Weight: 30%) — **2.0** | ||
| #### Category 2: Centralization & Control Risks (Weight: 30%) — **2.17** | ||
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| **Subcategory A: Governance — 1.0** |
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The 1.0 governance score is not consistent with the rubric: score 1 requires a 7+ day timelock and no EOA roles. Here getMinDelay() is 48h, an EOA operates rebase/balance updates, and the 2-of-8 strategist has broad untimelocked powers. Please score this subcategory at 3.0, or document why the rubric is being applied differently.
ctmotox2
reviewed
Sep 18, 2026
| 3. **Morpho curation — Yearn (not an external counterparty)** — every OUSD Morpho vault on all three chains is curated by Yearn: | ||
| - **Ethereum:** `OUSD-V2` and `OUSD-V1` are owned by the **Yearn Security multisig** ([`0xe5e2Baf9…89c0`](https://etherscan.io/address/0xe5e2Baf96198c56380dDD5E992D7d1ADa0e989c0), 4-of-7); `OUSD-V1` is curated by [`0x90D0…6B51`](https://etherscan.io/address/0x90D0f26025571295D18a6c041E47450B81886B51) (2-of-3) with a guardian and a 3-day timelock. | ||
| - **Base:** `OUSDb-V2` / `OUSDb-V1` owned by [`0xFEaE2F85…E36F`](https://basescan.org/address/0xFEaE2F855250c36A77b8C68dB07C4dD9711fE36F) (4-of-8, signer set overlapping Yearn Security), same curator Safe, guardian set, 3-day timelock. | ||
| - **HyperEVM:** `OUSDh-V2` / `OUSDh-V1` deployed and operated by the Yearn key [`0xFc5F89d2…C12B`](https://hyperevmscan.io/address/0xFc5F89d29CCaa86e5410a7ad9D9d280d4455C12B), which created both vaults and set `feeRecipient()` to the same Yearn curator Safe. This leg is configured more loosely than the other two — the key is an EOA rather than a Safe, `curator()` and `guardian()` are unset, and `timelock()` is 0, so cap and supply-queue changes take effect immediately. Withdrawals cannot be blocked: `setReceiveAssetsGate` and `setAdapterRegistry` are permanently abdicated on `OUSDh-V2`. |
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This repeats the incorrect control model. At the stated snapshot, both owner() values are the 4-of-7 Safe 0x518C…70149; both curator() values are 0x90D0…6B51; and OUSDh-V1 has guardian 0x4FF1…971 plus a 259,200-second timelock. Please remove the EOA/unset-role/zero-timelock narrative from this dependency analysis.
ctmotox2
reviewed
Sep 18, 2026
| | Date | Score | Notes | | ||
| |------|-------|-------| | ||
| | [June 25, 2026](https://github.com/yearn/risk-score/pull/136) | 1.85 | Initial assessment | | ||
| | [August 31, 2026](https://github.com/yearn/risk-score/pull/434) | 2.05 | TVL $6.24M (−16%). Traced the Morpho legs three vault layers deep across Ethereum, Base, and HyperEVM: ~80% of TVL now sits in Morpho Blue markets, and ~54% of TVL is USDC lent against Origin's own OETH / superOETHb in markets whose oracles assume a 1:1 ETH peg with no LST feed. Morpho curation on all three chains is Yearn's own, so it is treated as an internal counterparty rather than an external dependency; the HyperEVM leg is configured more loosely (EOA key, no guardian, `timelock()` = 0) and is called out for monitoring. Corrected the withdrawal-queue reading — `queued` / `claimable` are lifetime counters, so outstanding demand is 14 USDC, not the ~$1.68M implied previously. Vault uses no oracle (`_deprecated_priceProvider`) and rebase is permissioned and rate-capped. Bug bounty reconfirmed live at $1M. Governance, roles, thresholds, proxies, and the mint whitelist unchanged. Dependencies 2.5 → 3.0, Collateralization 2.0 → 2.5, Provability 1.5 → 2.0. | |
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This assessment-history entry repeats the disproven “EOA key, no guardian, timelock() = 0” claim. Please amend the record after correcting the HyperEVM ownership, curator, guardian, and timelock state, and recompute the score from the corrected control model.
ctmotox2
reviewed
Sep 18, 2026
| address: "0xE90959cbE7E56b5eBFF9AD12de611A4976F2d2B1" | ||
| chain: hyperevm | ||
| category: dependency | ||
| note: Symbol OUSDh-V2. Owner and curator are the same Yearn-operated key. The two selectors that could gate withdrawals, setReceiveAssetsGate and setAdapterRegistry, have been permanently abdicated. |
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The HyperEVM control nodes are incorrect throughout this block (lines 180, 186, and 192). Both vault owners are the 4-of-7 Safe 0x518C…70149; both curators are 0x90D0…6B51; OUSDh-V1 has guardian 0x4FF1…971 and a 259,200-second timelock. Remove the hyper-eoa node and replace its owner/curator edges with this model.
The score-1 bar of "7+ days" was out of line with how the corpus is actually scored: fx-fxusd already uses a local ">3 days" variant, and both sky-stusds (48h) and reserve-ethplus (3-day) dock against a bar that no longer reflects our view. Rows 2 and 3 also both read "24+ hours", which is not a monotonic ladder. - Score 1 timelock bar: 7+ days -> 48h+ - Rows 2 and 3 split into 24-48h and 12-24h so the ladder is monotonic - Note that timelock is measured on the protocol-change path end to end - Note that operational roles bounded by governance-approved constraints are scored under Programmability, not Governance Also expands the Origin OUSD governance rationale with the evidence for its 1.0: upgradeTo is onlyGovernor on all six proxies, PROPOSER and EXECUTOR are held solely by the xOGN Governor (both prior holders revoked in 2024), and the end-to-end path is exactly 5.00 days. Score is unchanged at 2.05. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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LGTM |
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Closes #433.
Reassessment of
reports/report/origin-ousd.mdat block 25876180 (Aug 31, 2026). Score moves 1.85 → 2.05 (still LOW RISK).What changed on-chain
totalValue()DeFiLlama-tracked TVL fell from ~$7.31M (mid-June) to ~$5.69M — a ~22% quarterly drawdown with no cliff.
Material findings
1. ~54% of TVL is credit exposure to Origin's own LSTs. The Ethereum Morpho leg is ~100% in the OETH/USDC market (86% LLTV, $2.97M) and ~35% of the Base leg is in the superOETHb/USDC market (77% LLTV, $421K). Both oracles resolve to Chainlink ETH/USD ÷ USDC/USD with no OETH/ETH or superOETHb/ETH feed — they hard-assume a 1:1 ETH peg, so a depeg produces bad debt rather than liquidations. Borrowers are third parties (38
Borrowevents from 15 distinct accounts over ~275K blocks), so this is collateral-quality exposure, not a self-loan.2. The Morpho legs are three vault layers deep, on three chains — and the curation is Yearn's own. Strategy → Morpho Vault V2 →
MorphoVaultV1Adapter→ MetaMorpho → Morpho Blue, replicated on Ethereum, Base, and HyperEVM. ~80% of OUSD's TVL ends up in Morpho Blue markets. Every one of the six vaults is curated by Yearn:OUSD-V2/OUSD-V1owned by Yearn Security (0xe5e2…89c0, 4-of-7);OUSD-V1curated by0x90D0…6B51(2-of-3), guardian set, 3-day timelock.OUSDb-V2/OUSDb-V1owned by0xFEaE…E36F(4-of-8, signer set overlaps Yearn Security), same curator Safe, guardian set, 3-day timelock.0xFc5F…C12B, which calledcreateMetaMorpho/createVaultV2and setfeeRecipient()to the same Yearn curator Safe.So this is scored as internal concentration, not a third-party dependency. The HyperEVM leg is nonetheless configured more loosely than the other two — EOA key rather than a Safe,
curator()andguardian()unset,timelock()= 0, so cap and supply-queue changes are immediate rather than 3-day. Recorded as a factual note plus a monitoring item, not as a key risk. Mitigating:OUSDh-V2has permanently abdicatedsetReceiveAssetsGateandsetAdapterRegistry, so withdrawals can never be gated.3. Liquidity is thinner than headline TVL. Only ~$1.59M of the $2.97M Ethereum Morpho position is withdrawable (84.6% utilization); the Base superOETHb market is 88.2% utilized with ~$50K free against a ~$421K position; the Curve pool's USDC side is ~$505K and 92.5% of that pool's LP is Origin's own AMO. Instantly reachable on Ethereum: ~$2.1M (~34% of TVL).
Two corrections to the June report
withdrawalQueueMetadata()returns lifetime cumulative counters;queuedandclaimableare running totals, not a live depth. June's "$1.68M queued ≈ 22.7% of supply" was the lifetime total. Actual pending demand isqueued − claimed— 17,205 USDC then, 14 USDC now. The report and the Monitoring section now say this explicitly so the misread isn't repeated.rebaseThreshold. The deployed implementation's price-provider slot is_deprecated_priceProviderand neitherVaultCorenorVaultAdminreads a feed. Rebase is not auto-triggered on user operations either:rebase()is restricted to operator / strategist / governor, and yield drips overdripDuration(7d) capped atrebasePerSecondMax(≈7.87% APR) and 2% per rebase.Bug bounty — reconfirmed live
Checked against the live Immunefi program page: $1,000,000 max for critical smart-contract reports, capped at 10% of economic damage with a $50,000 floor; High flat $15,000; Safe Harbor enabled; PoC required, no KYC; payouts made by Origin in OUSD. Live since Nov 22 2021, program last updated Aug 4 2026. Corrected the asset count (34 → 28) and added the payout track record: 40 paid reports totalling $139.2K, median resolution 7 hours.
Unchanged
Timelock 48h and self-administered; PROPOSER/EXECUTOR/CANCELLER on Origin DeFi Governance, CANCELLER also on the 5-of-8 GOV multisig; strategist 2-of-8; trustee 1-of-3;
trusteeFeeBps2000;vaultBuffer0;maxSupplyDiff5%;withdrawalClaimDelay600s; both proxies on the same implementations; Curve AMO still the only mint-whitelisted strategy; vault unpaused. No timelock execution since June targeted the OUSD vault or token. No new OUSD audit since Sigma Prime (Feb 2026) — whose scope did cover the vault upgrade and the cross-chain CCTP strategies.Scoring
Also updated
reports/graph/origin-ousd.yaml— expanded to the full three-chain Morpho stack, added the operator EOA and the three curation authorities, dropped the deprecated Oracle Router node, refreshed allocation labels. The two MetaMorpho vaults are taggedmorphoVault: v1soscripts/update_morpho_graph_markets.mjsexpands their markets; HyperEVM markets are authored by hand since the generator only supports Ethereum and Base.src/data/bridges.json— CCTP detail updated to ~36% of TVL and the message-bus role.Validation
npm run build— 108 pages, 0 errors.check_graphsreports only the pre-existing shared-address warning betweenorigin-armandorigin-ousdon the trustee Safe.node scripts/update_morpho_graph_markets.mjs --graph origin-ousdis clean.🤖 Generated with Claude Code