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The mergeConfig function in axios crashes with a TypeError when processing configuration objects containing __proto__ as an own property. An attacker can trigger this by providing a malicious configuration object created via JSON.parse(), causing complete denial of service.
Details
The vulnerability exists in lib/core/mergeConfig.js at lines 98-101:
TypeError: merge is not a function
at computeConfigValue (lib/core/mergeConfig.js:100:25)
at Object.forEach (lib/utils.js:280:10)
at mergeConfig (lib/core/mergeConfig.js:98:9)
Control tests performed:
Test
Config
Result
Normal config
{"timeout": 5000}
SUCCESS
Malicious config
JSON.parse('{"__proto__": {"x": 1}}')
CRASH
Nested object
{"headers": {"X-Test": "value"}}
SUCCESS
Attack scenario:
An application that accepts user input, parses it with JSON.parse(), and passes it to axios configuration will crash when receiving the payload {"__proto__": {"x": 1}}.
Impact
Denial of Service - Any application using axios that processes user-controlled JSON and passes it to axios configuration methods is vulnerable. The application will crash when processing the malicious payload.
Affected environments:
Node.js servers using axios for HTTP requests
Any backend that passes parsed JSON to axios configuration
This is NOT prototype pollution - the application crashes before any assignment occurs.
Vulnerability Disclosure: Unrestricted Cloud Metadata Exfiltration via Header Injection Chain
Summary
The Axios library is vulnerable to a specific gadget-style attack chain in which prototype pollution in a third-party dependency may be leveraged to inject unsanitized header values into outbound requests.
Axios can be used as a gadget after pollution occurs elsewhere because header values merged from attacker-controlled prototype properties are not sanitized for CRLF (\r\n) characters before being written to the request. In affected deployments, this may enable limited request manipulation or metadata access as part of a higher-complexity exploit chain.
Severity: Moderate (CVSS 3.1 Base Score: 4.8) Affected Versions: All versions (v0.x - v1.x) Vulnerable Component: lib/adapters/http.js (Header Processing)
Usage of "Helper" Vulnerabilities
This issue requires a separate prototype pollution vulnerability in another library in the application stack (for example, qs, minimist, ini, or body-parser). If an attacker can pollute Object.prototype, Axios may pick up the polluted properties during config merge.
Because Axios does not sanitise these merged header values for CRLF (\r\n) characters, the polluted property can alter the structure of an outbound HTTP request.
Proof of Concept
1. The Setup (Simulated Pollution)
Imagine a scenario where a known vulnerability exists in a query parser. The attacker sends a payload that sets:
In environments where requests can reach cloud metadata endpoints or sensitive internal services, the injected header content may help bypass expected request constraints and expose limited credentials or modify request semantics. This impact depends on application context and a separate prototype-pollution primitive.
Impact Analysis
Confidentiality: May expose limited sensitive information in affected network environments.
Integrity: May allow modification of outbound request structure or injected headers.
Attack Complexity: Exploitation requires a separate prototype-pollution vulnerability and a reachable target service.
Recommended Fix
Validate all header values in lib/adapters/http.js and xhr.js before passing them to the underlying request function.
Patch Suggestion:
// In lib/adapters/http.jsutils.forEach(requestHeaders,functionsetRequestHeader(val,key){if(/[\r\n]/.test(val)){thrownewError('Security: Header value contains invalid characters');}// ... proceed to set header});
References
OWASP: CRLF Injection (CWE-113)
This report was generated as part of a security audit of the Axios library.
Axios does not correctly handle hostname normalization when checking NO_PROXY rules.
Requests to loopback addresses like localhost. (with a trailing dot) or [::1] (IPv6 literal) skip NO_PROXY matching and go through the configured proxy.
This goes against what developers expect and lets attackers force requests through a proxy, even if NO_PROXY is set up to protect loopback or internal services.
According to RFC 1034 §3.1 and RFC 3986 §3.2.2, a hostname can have a trailing dot to show it is a fully qualified domain name (FQDN). At the DNS level, localhost. is the same as localhost.
However, Axios does a literal string comparison instead of normalizing hostnames before checking NO_PROXY. This causes requests like http://localhost.:8080/ and http://[::1]:8080/ to be incorrectly proxied.
This issue leads to the possibility of proxy bypass and SSRF vulnerabilities allowing attackers to reach sensitive loopback or internal services despite the configured protections.
PoC
importhttpfrom"http";importaxiosfrom"axios";constproxyPort=5300;http.createServer((req,res)=>{console.log("[PROXY] Got:",req.method,req.url,"Host:",req.headers.host);res.writeHead(200,{"Content-Type": "text/plain"});res.end("proxied");}).listen(proxyPort,()=>console.log("Proxy",proxyPort));process.env.HTTP_PROXY=`http://127.0.0.1:${proxyPort}`;process.env.NO_PROXY="localhost,127.0.0.1,::1";asyncfunctiontest(url){try{awaitaxios.get(url,{timeout: 2000});}catch{}}setTimeout(async()=>{console.log("\n[*] Testing http://localhost.:8080/");awaittest("http://localhost.:8080/");// goes through proxyconsole.log("\n[*] Testing http://[::1]:8080/");awaittest("http://[::1]:8080/");// goes through proxy},500);
Expected: Requests bypass the proxy (direct to loopback). Actual: Proxy logs requests for localhost. and [::1].
Impact
Applications that rely on NO_PROXY=localhost,127.0.0.1,::1 for protecting loopback/internal access are vulnerable.
Attackers controlling request URLs can:
Force Axios to send local traffic through an attacker-controlled proxy.
Bypass SSRF mitigations relying on NO_PROXY rules.
Potentially exfiltrate sensitive responses from internal services via the proxy.
Affected Versions
Confirmed on Axios 1.12.2 (latest at time of testing).
affects all versions that rely on Axios’ current NO_PROXY evaluation.
Remediation
Axios should normalize hostnames before evaluating NO_PROXY, including:
Strip trailing dots from hostnames (per RFC 3986).
Normalize IPv6 literals by removing brackets for matching.
A prototype pollution gadget exists in the Axios HTTP adapter (lib/adapters/http.js) that allows an attacker to inject arbitrary HTTP headers into outgoing requests. The vulnerability exploits duck-type checking of the data payload, where if Object.prototype is polluted with getHeaders, append, pipe, on, once, and Symbol.toStringTag, Axios misidentifies any plain object payload as a FormData instance and calls the attacker-controlled getHeaders() function, merging the returned headers into the outgoing request.
The vulnerable code resides exclusively in lib/adapters/http.js. The prototype pollution source does not need to originate from Axios itself — any prototype pollution primitive in any dependency in the application's dependency tree is sufficient to trigger this gadget.
Prerequisites:
A prototype pollution primitive must exist somewhere in the application's dependency chain (e.g., via lodash.merge, qs, JSON5, or any deep-merge utility processing attacker-controlled input). The pollution source is not required to be in Axios.
The application must use Axios to make HTTP requests with a data payload (POST, PUT, PATCH).
Details
The vulnerability is in lib/adapters/http.js, in the data serialization pipeline:
Note on Scope: There is an argument to promote this from S:U to S:C (Scope: Changed), which would raise the score to 10.0. In some architectures, Axios is commonly used for service to service communication where downstream services trust identity headers (Authorization, X-Role, X-User-ID, X-Tenant-ID) forwarded from upstream API gateways. In this scenario, the vulnerable component (Axios in Service A) and the impacted component (Service B, which acts on the injected identity) are under different security authorities. The injected headers cross a trust boundary, meaning the impact extends beyond the security scope of the vulnerable component, the CVSS v3.1 definition of a Scope Change. We conservatively score S:U here, but maintainers should evaluate which one applies better here.
Recommended Fix
Add an explicit own-property check in lib/adapters/http.js:
- } else if (utils.isFormData(data) && utils.isFunction(data.getHeaders)) {- headers.set(data.getHeaders());+ } else if (utils.isFormData(data) && utils.isFunction(data.getHeaders) &&+ Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(data, 'getHeaders')) {+ headers.set(data.getHeaders());
Added a clear() function to the request and response interceptors object so a user can ensure that all interceptors have been removed from an axios instance #4248
There are multiple deprecations, refactors and fixes provided in this release. Please read through the full release notes to see how this may impact your project and use case.
Removed
Removed incorrect argument for NetworkError constructor #4656
This release focuses on platform compatibility, error handling improvements, and code quality maintenance.
⚠️ Important Changes
Breaking Changes: None identified in this release.
Action Required: Users targeting React Native should verify their integration, particularly if relying on specific Blob or FormData behaviours, as improvements have been made to support these objects.
🚀 New Features
React Native Blob Support: Axios now includes support for React Native Blob objects. Thanks to @moh3n9595 for the initial implementation. (#5764)
Code Quality: Implemented prettier across the codebase and resolved associated formatting issues. (#7385)
🐛 Bug Fixes
Environment Compatibility:
Fixed module exports for React Native and Browserify environments. (#7386)
Added safe FormData detection for the WeChat Mini Program environment. (#7324)
Error Handling:
AxiosError.message is now correctly enumerable. (#7392)
AxiosError.from now correctly copies the status property from the source error, ensuring better error propagation. (#7403)
🔧 Maintenance & Chores
Dependencies: Updated the development_dependencies group (5 updates). (#7432)
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renovateBot
changed the title
⬆️(dependencies) update axios to v1.13.5 [SECURITY]
⬆️(dependencies) update axios to v1.13.5 [SECURITY] - autoclosed
Feb 19, 2026
renovateBot
changed the title
⬆️(dependencies) update axios to v1.13.5 [SECURITY] - autoclosed
⬆️(dependencies) update axios to v1.13.5 [SECURITY]
Feb 21, 2026
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This PR contains the following updates:
1.9.0→1.15.1Axios is Vulnerable to Denial of Service via proto Key in mergeConfig
CVE-2026-25639 / GHSA-43fc-jf86-j433
More information
Details
Denial of Service via proto Key in mergeConfig
Summary
The
mergeConfigfunction in axios crashes with a TypeError when processing configuration objects containing__proto__as an own property. An attacker can trigger this by providing a malicious configuration object created viaJSON.parse(), causing complete denial of service.Details
The vulnerability exists in
lib/core/mergeConfig.jsat lines 98-101:When
propis'__proto__':JSON.parse('{"__proto__": {...}}')creates an object with__proto__as an own enumerable propertyObject.keys()includes'__proto__'in the iterationmergeMap['__proto__']performs prototype chain lookup, returningObject.prototype(truthy object)mergeMap[prop] || mergeDeepPropertiesevaluates toObject.prototypeObject.prototype(...)throwsTypeError: merge is not a functionThe
mergeConfigfunction is called by:Axios._request()atlib/core/Axios.js:75Axios.getUri()atlib/core/Axios.js:201get,post, etc.) atlib/core/Axios.js:211,224PoC
Reproduction steps:
npm install axiospoc.mjswith the code abovenode poc.mjsVerified output (axios 1.13.4):
Control tests performed:
{"timeout": 5000}JSON.parse('{"__proto__": {"x": 1}}'){"headers": {"X-Test": "value"}}Attack scenario:
An application that accepts user input, parses it with
JSON.parse(), and passes it to axios configuration will crash when receiving the payload{"__proto__": {"x": 1}}.Impact
Denial of Service - Any application using axios that processes user-controlled JSON and passes it to axios configuration methods is vulnerable. The application will crash when processing the malicious payload.
Affected environments:
This is NOT prototype pollution - the application crashes before any assignment occurs.
Severity
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:HReferences
This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).
Axios has Unrestricted Cloud Metadata Exfiltration via Header Injection Chain
CVE-2026-40175 / GHSA-fvcv-3m26-pcqx
More information
Details
Vulnerability Disclosure: Unrestricted Cloud Metadata Exfiltration via Header Injection Chain
Summary
The Axios library is vulnerable to a specific gadget-style attack chain in which prototype pollution in a third-party dependency may be leveraged to inject unsanitized header values into outbound requests.
Axios can be used as a gadget after pollution occurs elsewhere because header values merged from attacker-controlled prototype properties are not sanitized for CRLF (
\r\n) characters before being written to the request. In affected deployments, this may enable limited request manipulation or metadata access as part of a higher-complexity exploit chain.Severity: Moderate (CVSS 3.1 Base Score: 4.8)
Affected Versions: All versions (v0.x - v1.x)
Vulnerable Component:
lib/adapters/http.js(Header Processing)Usage of "Helper" Vulnerabilities
This issue requires a separate prototype pollution vulnerability in another library in the application stack (for example,
qs,minimist,ini, orbody-parser). If an attacker can polluteObject.prototype, Axios may pick up the polluted properties during config merge.Because Axios does not sanitise these merged header values for CRLF (
\r\n) characters, the polluted property can alter the structure of an outbound HTTP request.Proof of Concept
1. The Setup (Simulated Pollution)
Imagine a scenario where a known vulnerability exists in a query parser. The attacker sends a payload that sets:
2. The Gadget Trigger (Safe Code)
The application makes a completely safe, hardcoded request:
3. The Execution
Axios merges the prototype property
x-amz-targetinto the request headers. It then writes the header value directly to the socket without validation.Resulting HTTP traffic:
4. The Impact
In environments where requests can reach cloud metadata endpoints or sensitive internal services, the injected header content may help bypass expected request constraints and expose limited credentials or modify request semantics. This impact depends on application context and a separate prototype-pollution primitive.
Impact Analysis
Recommended Fix
Validate all header values in
lib/adapters/http.jsandxhr.jsbefore passing them to the underlying request function.Patch Suggestion:
References
This report was generated as part of a security audit of the Axios library.
Severity
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:NReferences
This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).
Axios has a NO_PROXY Hostname Normalization Bypass that Leads to SSRF
CVE-2025-62718 / GHSA-3p68-rc4w-qgx5
More information
Details
Axios does not correctly handle hostname normalization when checking
NO_PROXYrules.Requests to loopback addresses like
localhost.(with a trailing dot) or[::1](IPv6 literal) skipNO_PROXYmatching and go through the configured proxy.This goes against what developers expect and lets attackers force requests through a proxy, even if
NO_PROXYis set up to protect loopback or internal services.According to RFC 1034 §3.1 and RFC 3986 §3.2.2, a hostname can have a trailing dot to show it is a fully qualified domain name (FQDN). At the DNS level,
localhost.is the same aslocalhost.However, Axios does a literal string comparison instead of normalizing hostnames before checking
NO_PROXY. This causes requests likehttp://localhost.:8080/andhttp://[::1]:8080/to be incorrectly proxied.This issue leads to the possibility of proxy bypass and SSRF vulnerabilities allowing attackers to reach sensitive loopback or internal services despite the configured protections.
PoC
Expected: Requests bypass the proxy (direct to loopback).
Actual: Proxy logs requests for
localhost.and[::1].Impact
Applications that rely on
NO_PROXY=localhost,127.0.0.1,::1for protecting loopback/internal access are vulnerable.Attackers controlling request URLs can:
Affected Versions
NO_PROXYevaluation.Remediation
Axios should normalize hostnames before evaluating
NO_PROXY, including:Severity
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:L/SI:L/SA:NReferences
This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).
Axios: Header Injection via Prototype Pollution
CVE-2026-42035 / GHSA-6chq-wfr3-2hj9
More information
Details
Summary
A prototype pollution gadget exists in the Axios HTTP adapter (lib/adapters/http.js) that allows an attacker to inject arbitrary HTTP headers into outgoing requests. The vulnerability exploits duck-type checking of the data payload, where if Object.prototype is polluted with getHeaders, append, pipe, on, once, and Symbol.toStringTag, Axios misidentifies any plain object payload as a FormData instance and calls the attacker-controlled getHeaders() function, merging the returned headers into the outgoing request.
The vulnerable code resides exclusively in lib/adapters/http.js. The prototype pollution source does not need to originate from Axios itself — any prototype pollution primitive in any dependency in the application's dependency tree is sufficient to trigger this gadget.
Prerequisites:
A prototype pollution primitive must exist somewhere in the application's dependency chain (e.g., via lodash.merge, qs, JSON5, or any deep-merge utility processing attacker-controlled input). The pollution source is not required to be in Axios.
The application must use Axios to make HTTP requests with a data payload (POST, PUT, PATCH).
Details
The vulnerability is in
lib/adapters/http.js, in the data serialization pipeline:Axios uses two sequential duck-type checks, both of which can be satisfied via prototype pollution:
1.
utils.isFormData(data)—lib/utils.js2.
utils.isFunction(data.getHeaders)— Duck-type forform-datanpm packagePoC
Impact
Note on Scope: There is an argument to promote this from S:U to S:C (Scope: Changed), which would raise the score to 10.0. In some architectures, Axios is commonly used for service to service communication where downstream services trust identity headers (
Authorization,X-Role,X-User-ID,X-Tenant-ID) forwarded from upstream API gateways. In this scenario, the vulnerable component (Axios in Service A) and the impacted component (Service B, which acts on the injected identity) are under different security authorities. The injected headers cross a trust boundary, meaning the impact extends beyond the security scope of the vulnerable component, the CVSS v3.1 definition of a Scope Change. We conservatively score S:U here, but maintainers should evaluate which one applies better here.Recommended Fix
Add an explicit own-property check in
lib/adapters/http.js:Severity
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:NReferences
This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).
Release Notes
axios/axios (axios)
v1.15.1Compare Source
v1.15.0Compare Source
Bug Fixes
Features
Contributors to this release
PRs
1.2.6 (2023-01-28)
Bug Fixes
CommonRequestHeadersList&CommonResponseHeadersListtypes to be private in commonJS; (#5503) (5a3d0a3)Contributors to this release
PRs
1.2.5 (2023-01-26)
Bug Fixes
Contributors to this release
PRs
1.2.4 (2023-01-22)
Bug Fixes
RawAxiosRequestConfigback toAxiosRequestConfig; (#5486) (2a71f49)AxiosRequestConfiggeneric; (#5478) (9bce81b)Contributors to this release
PRs
1.2.3 (2023-01-10)
Bug Fixes
Contributors to this release
PRs
[1.2.2] - 2022-12-29
Fixed
Chores
Contributors to this release
[1.2.1] - 2022-12-05
Changed
Fixed
Refactors
Chores
Contributors to this release
PRs
[1.2.0] - 2022-11-10
Changed
Fixed
Refactors
Chores
Contributors to this release
PRs
[1.1.3] - 2022-10-15
Added
Fixed
Chores
Contributors to this release
PRs
[1.1.2] - 2022-10-07
Fixed
Contributors to this release
PRs
[1.1.1] - 2022-10-07
Fixed
Contributors to this release
PRs
[1.1.0] - 2022-10-06
Fixed
Contributors to this release
PRs
[1.0.0] - 2022-10-04
Added
Changed
Deprecated
Removed
Fixed
Chores
Security
Contributors to this release
Bertrand Marron
Dmitriy Mozgovoy
Dan Mooney
Michael Li
aong
Des Preston
Ted Robertson
zhoulixiang
Arthur Fiorette
Kumar Shanu
JALAL
Jingyi Lin
Philipp Loose
Alexander Shchukin
Dave Cardwell
Cat Scarlet
Luca Pizzini
Kai
Maxime Bargiel
Brian Helba
reslear
Jamie Slome
Landro3
rafw87
Afzal Sayed
Koki Oyatsu
Dave
暴走老七
Spencer
Adrian Wieprzkowicz
Jamie Telin
毛呆
Kirill Shakirov
Rraji Abdelbari
Jelle Schutter
Tom Ceuppens
Johann Cooper
Dimitris Halatsis
chenjigeng
João Gabriel Quaresma
Victor Augusto
neilnaveen
Pavlos
Kiryl Valkovich
Naveen
wenzheng
hcwhan
Bassel Rachid
Grégoire Pineau
felipedamin
Karl Horky
Yue JIN
Usman Ali Siddiqui
WD
Günther Foidl
Stephen Jennings
C.T.Lin
mia-z
Parth Banathia
parth0105pluang
Marco Weber
Luca Pizzini
Willian Agostini
Huyen Nguyen
v1.14.0Compare Source
v1.13.6Compare Source
This release focuses on platform compatibility, error handling improvements, and code quality maintenance.
🚀 New Features
🐛 Bug Fixes
Environment Compatibility:
Error Handling:
🔧 Maintenance & Chores
🌟 New Contributors
We are thrilled to welcome our new contributors! Thank you for helping improve the project:
Configuration
📅 Schedule: (UTC)
🚦 Automerge: Disabled by config. Please merge this manually once you are satisfied.
♻ Rebasing: Whenever PR becomes conflicted, or you tick the rebase/retry checkbox.
🔕 Ignore: Close this PR and you won't be reminded about this update again.
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