feat: document what token and session revocation does and doesn't reach - #802
feat: document what token and session revocation does and doesn't reach#802onderay wants to merge 3 commits into
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WalkthroughThe documentation defines SSO session policies, backend session termination, token revocation behavior, access-token expiry, and the effects of user suspension or deletion. ChangesAuthentication lifecycle documentation
Estimated code review effort: 3 (Moderate) | ~25 minutes Merge Risk: 🟡 Moderate · up to The PR documents token revocation and account-lifecycle behavior, but current wording still overstates when access ends after revocation and does not clearly warn that deletion may allow a new account with the same identifier. These inaccuracies could lead to incorrect security controls and should be corrected before merge. Suggested reviewers: Poem
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Kinde access tokens are stateless JWTs. Revoking a token, ending a user's sessions, or deleting/suspending a user ends the SSO session and invalidates refresh tokens immediately, but an access token already issued keeps verifying until it expires. This is inherent to stateless validation and is working as designed, but no narrative page said so. - configure-tokens: add "What revocation does and doesn't do", with a table of what revocation reaches, and guidance on narrowing the window before an issued token expires (shorten the access token lifetime; use /oauth2/introspect sparingly) - delete-or-suspend-users: add "What happens to sessions and tokens", and note the same expiry window applies to the blocklist workarounds - session-management: add "End a user's sessions from your backend", covering the Management API session invalidation endpoint - about-access-tokens: note that revocation does not shorten the lifetime of an already-issued access token Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Actionable comments posted: 1
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Inline comments:
In `@src/content/docs/build/tokens/configure-tokens.mdx`:
- Line 117: Update the documentation around the statements at lines 117 and 121
to distinguish account suspension or deletion from session/refresh-token
revocation: suspension or deletion blocks new tokens, while revocation forces
reauthentication without preventing an active user from signing in again.
Describe the existing access-token validity window as at most the configured
lifetime.
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src/content/docs/authenticate/manage-authentication/session-management.mdxsrc/content/docs/build/tokens/about-access-tokens.mdxsrc/content/docs/build/tokens/configure-tokens.mdxsrc/content/docs/manage-users/access-control/delete-or-suspend-users.mdx
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tamalchowdhury
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Fix CR issue, add new screenshots, clarified steps. This is good to go.
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Actionable comments posted: 3
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Inline comments:
In `@src/content/docs/authenticate/manage-authentication/session-management.mdx`:
- Line 39: Update the session-management documentation wording: change “Kinde
authenticated sessions” to “Kinde-authenticated sessions” and revise the wording
at the referenced second location to use “on a per-application basis.”
In `@src/content/docs/build/tokens/configure-tokens.mdx`:
- Line 122: Revise the access-token lifetime guidance near “Shorten the access
token lifetime” to state that it limits remaining access for the revoked session
only, not that it prevents the user from signing in again. Preserve the
recommendation of a short access-token lifetime with refresh tokens and clarify
that subsequent refreshes for the revoked session fail.
In `@src/content/docs/manage-users/access-control/delete-or-suspend-users.mdx`:
- Line 112: Update the documentation paragraph about webhook-triggered
suspension or deletion to explicitly state that deleting an account does not
prevent the same identifier from signing up again when self-sign-up is enabled;
recommend a persistent identifier check or suspension when future sign-ups must
be blocked.
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src/content/docs/authenticate/manage-authentication/session-management.mdxsrc/content/docs/build/tokens/about-access-tokens.mdxsrc/content/docs/build/tokens/configure-tokens.mdxsrc/content/docs/manage-users/access-control/delete-or-suspend-users.mdx
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Description (required)
Kinde access tokens are stateless JWTs. Revoking a token or ending a user's sessions ends the SSO session and invalidates refresh tokens immediately, but an access token that has already been issued keeps verifying until it expires. The same applies when an admin deletes or suspends a user. This is inherent to stateless validation and is working as designed.
The docs did not say so anywhere. Configure token and session expiry documented
/oauth2/revokewithout stating what revocation cannot reach; Delete or suspend users said nothing about sessions or tokens at all; and Session management never mentioned server-side revocation. That left a gap for anyone who assumes revoking a session or deleting a user takes effect on tokens that have already been handed out.Who this helps: developers choosing an access token lifetime and reasoning about when revocation takes effect, and admins who expect suspension or deletion to apply immediately.
Three new sections plus three one-sentence cross-references. No new pages, no sidebar changes (these directories autogenerate), no code samples.
On the introspection guidance:
/oauth2/introspectis deliberately framed as a rarely-appropriate escape hatch for a small number of high-value actions, with an explicit "do not use it for routine request authorization". Shortening the access token lifetime is presented as the control to reach for. The endpoint isn't currently documented anywhere on the docs site, so it's named without a link or request example — adding a reference page for it is separate work.Verification
npm run build— clean.node ./scripts/validate-links.js(the CI gate) — "All internal links are valid."dist/that every new anchor exists and every inbound link resolves to one:#what-revocation-does-and-doesnt-do,#close-the-window,#set-token-lifetimes,#end-a-users-sessions-from-your-backend,#what-happens-to-sessions-and-tokens.<Aside>blocks render as real<aside>elements; the new table renders inside.table-wrapper; the new H2s and H3 appear in their pages' tables of contents;`DELETE /api/v1/users/{user_id}/sessions`renders literally (braces not evaluated as JSX).main— the warnings on these files are all pre-existing.page_idvalues changed.One thing to check in review:
delete:user_sessionsis not documented anywhere on the site, so I couldn't verify it from the repo. Please confirm it matches the scope name customers actually see when configuring M2M app scopes. The Management API link uses the tag-level#tag/usersrather than the operation anchor, since that reference is rendered client-side by Scalar from a remotely-fetched spec and an anchor containing{user_id}is the least stable thing to link — happy to upgrade it if someone verifies the operation anchor resolves.Out of scope: the
DELETE /api/v1/users/{user_id}/sessionsoperation description ("Invalidate user sessions") would benefit from mentioning stateless validation too, but the Management API specs are fetched at build time fromapi-spec.kinde.comand don't live in this repo. That needs routing through the spec repo separately.Related issues & labels (optional)
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