BitAgent is a self-hosted BitTorrent DHT crawler and Torznab provider. We treat security findings as first-class.

Patches land on main first, then back-port to the latest tag.

Do not file a public issue or discussion thread for a security finding.

Use GitHub Security Advisories to open a private report. Include:

• Affected commit SHA or release tag
• Steps to reproduce (curl invocations, payloads, deployment shape)
• Impact assessment (auth bypass, RCE, data exfiltration, DoS, etc.)
• Optional: a suggested fix

We aim to acknowledge within 48 hours and triage within 7 days. A coordinated disclosure window of 90 days is standard; extensions are negotiable for complex fixes or upstream coordination.

In scope (this repository — gekleos/bitagent):

• The operator dashboard under ui/ (FastAPI + Jinja2 + static assets), including its auth surface and TMDB integration
• The example deployments under examples/ (compose.public.yml, compose.authelia.yml, compose.tailnet.yml, prowlarr/)
• The repair/sanitize tooling under scripts/
• The published Docker image docker.io/gekleos/bitagent-ui (and any future gekleos/* images we publish)
• Documented integration paths surfaced by the dashboard (Sonarr/Radarr evidence webhook, Torznab, GraphQL admin)

Out of scope:

• Issues in upstream bitmagnet-io/bitmagnet that we have not modified — please report those upstream.
• BitTorrent BEP protocol weaknesses — those are protocol-layer and belong with the BEP authors.
• Issues in third-party trackers, indexers, or *arr projects.
• Findings that require physical access, OS-level compromise, or already having admin credentials.

There is no monetary bounty. With the reporter's permission, valid findings are credited in the Hall of Fame below once a fix has shipped.

Untrusted DHT input. The DHT crawler ingests attacker-controlled input at high volume (torrent names, metainfo strings, peer announcements). All parsing paths must be defensive: no panics on malformed input, hard-cap input lengths, regex engines bounded by RE2 or equivalent, classifier rules sandboxed.

Public-internet Torznab. When TORZNAB_API_KEY is empty, the Torznab endpoint is open. Public-internet deployments must always set the key. The dashboard's DASHBOARD_API_KEY is a separate secret that gates the operator UI; never reuse it for the Torznab endpoint.

GraphQL admin surface. The GraphQL endpoint is privileged. It expects to live behind a trusted reverse proxy or tailnet; the public-release plan layers an API-key gate on the dashboard side. Direct exposure without the gate is unsupported.

Postgres data layer. A SQL-injection or unsafe migration would be high severity; only parameterised paths are accepted in the data layer. The classifier writes through the same parameterised gateway.

(Empty — be the first.)