scripts: π‘οΈ Sentinel: [CRITICAL] Fix command injection in feeds update - #249
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Signed-off-by: google-labs-jules[bot] <161369871+google-labs-jules[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: manupawickramasinghe <73810867+manupawickramasinghe@users.noreply.github.com>
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π¨ Severity: CRITICAL
π‘ Vulnerability: Unquoted variable interpolation in a
system()shell command inscripts/feeds.π― Impact: An attacker who controls a feed name could inject arbitrary shell commands during feed initialization. Specifically,
$safenameand$localpath_origwere interpolated into a shell string without being enclosed in single quotes, despite having their own single quotes escaped.π§ Fix: Wrapped the interpolated variables
$safename,$localpath_orig, and$flags->{'root'}in single quotes within thesystem()call to prevent shell word splitting and injection.β Verification: Verified by manual inspection and running
perl -c scripts/feedsto check syntax.PR created automatically by Jules for task 2887205039955759445 started by @manupawickramasinghe