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harden socket privacy with private directory validation - #1034
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MalpenZibo merged 1 commit intoOct 8, 2026
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The IPC socket used to drop back to
$TMPDIR/ashell-<uid>.sockwith no peer auth, so another local user could squat or spoof it (a planted fake server could even push escape sequences into the victim's ashell msg output).This change mirrors tmux: under an unusable
XDG_RUNTIME_DIR, the socket goes in$TMPDIR/ashell-<uid>/ashell.sock, in a0700directory the server creates and both sides refuse unless it's a real (non-symlink) dir owned by the effective uid with mode0700. On top of that (defense in depth), the accept loop rejects any peer whosepeer_cred().uid()isn't us and writes backerror permission denied. Wewarn!when the fallback is taken.