🛡️ Sentinel: [HIGH] Fix XSS Vulnerability in Default CSP

[EffortlessSteven]

🚨 Severity: HIGH
💡 Vulnerability: The default Content Security Policy (CSP) implementation in SecurityHeadersConfig included 'unsafe-inline' and 'unsafe-eval', which are highly insecure and can lead to Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerabilities.
🎯 Impact: If exploited, an attacker could execute arbitrary JavaScript in the context of the user's browser, potentially leading to unauthorized actions, data theft, or complete account compromise.
🔧 Fix: Hardened the Default implementation for SecurityHeadersConfig in crates/http-middleware/src/security_headers.rs and crates/app-http/src/middleware/security_headers.rs to provide strict, production-ready CSP settings by removing 'unsafe-inline' and 'unsafe-eval'. The development configuration still uses the more permissive settings for local environment needs.
✅ Verification: Ran cargo test -p http-middleware and cargo test -p app-http to ensure the configurations and tests pass with the stricter settings.

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PR created automatically by Jules for task 13254973477489825114 started by @EffortlessSteven

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Note

Medium Risk
Default CSP is stricter for any code path that uses SecurityHeadersConfig::default() instead of from_sources()/development(), which may block inline scripts or eval until config is adjusted.

Overview
Tightens the default Content-Security-Policy on SecurityHeadersConfig::default() in both app-http and http-middleware by dropping 'unsafe-inline' and 'unsafe-eval' from script-src and style-src, aligning the default with the existing strict production CSP string.

Comments on the default impl now direct callers to from_sources() (app-http) or development() (http-middleware) for permissive dev CSP. Env-based production vs development behavior in from_sources() is unchanged.

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📥 Commits

Reviewing files that changed from the base of the PR and between 3debe49 and 54ee0d0.

📒 Files selected for processing (2)

• crates/app-http/src/middleware/security_headers.rs
• crates/http-middleware/src/security_headers.rs

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[gemini-code-assist]

Code Review

This pull request hardens the default Content Security Policy (CSP) in both crates/app-http and crates/http-middleware by removing 'unsafe-inline' and 'unsafe-eval' directives. The reviewer recommends further strengthening the CSP by adding object-src 'none' and base-uri 'none' directives to prevent common bypasses.

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[gemini-code-assist]

While removing 'unsafe-inline' and 'unsafe-eval' significantly hardens the Content Security Policy (CSP), the policy is still missing some critical directives to prevent common CSP bypasses:

1. object-src 'none': Prevents the injection of plugins (like Flash or Java) which can be used to execute arbitrary scripts.
2. base-uri 'none' (or 'self'): Prevents attackers from injecting a tag to hijack relative URLs (e.g., redirecting scripts or styles to an attacker-controlled domain).

Consider adding these directives to make the default CSP truly robust and production-ready.

Suggested change

	content_security_policy: Some(
	"default-src 'self'; script-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline' 'unsafe-eval'; style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; img-src 'self' data: https:; font-src 'self' data:; connect-src 'self'; frame-ancestors 'none';".to_string(),
	"default-src 'self'; script-src 'self'; style-src 'self'; img-src 'self' data: https:; font-src 'self' data:; connect-src 'self'; frame-ancestors 'none';".to_string(),
	),
	content_security_policy: Some(
	"default-src 'self'; object-src 'none'; base-uri 'none'; script-src 'self'; style-src 'self'; img-src 'self' data: https:; font-src 'self' data:; connect-src 'self'; frame-ancestors 'none';".to_string(),
	),

[gemini-code-assist]

While removing 'unsafe-inline' and 'unsafe-eval' significantly hardens the Content Security Policy (CSP), the policy is still missing some critical directives to prevent common CSP bypasses:

1. object-src 'none': Prevents the injection of plugins (like Flash or Java) which can be used to execute arbitrary scripts.
2. base-uri 'none' (or 'self'): Prevents attackers from injecting a tag to hijack relative URLs (e.g., redirecting scripts or styles to an attacker-controlled domain).

Consider adding these directives to make the default CSP truly robust and production-ready.

Suggested change

	content_security_policy: Some(
	"default-src 'self'; script-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline' 'unsafe-eval'; style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; img-src 'self' data: https:; font-src 'self' data:; connect-src 'self'; frame-ancestors 'none';".to_string(),
	"default-src 'self'; script-src 'self'; style-src 'self'; img-src 'self' data: https:; font-src 'self' data:; connect-src 'self'; frame-ancestors 'none';".to_string(),
	),
	content_security_policy: Some(
	"default-src 'self'; object-src 'none'; base-uri 'none'; script-src 'self'; style-src 'self'; img-src 'self' data: https:; font-src 'self' data:; connect-src 'self'; frame-ancestors 'none';".to_string(),
	),

[github-actions]

Test Results

283 tests   245 ✅  10m 56s ⏱️
 25 suites   38 💤
  1 files      0 ❌

Results for commit 54ee0d0.

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