You signed in with another tab or window. Reload to refresh your session.You signed out in another tab or window. Reload to refresh your session.You switched accounts on another tab or window. Reload to refresh your session.Dismiss alert
Mostly this introduces new Error structs instead of using anyhow for some internal operations (not public API changes, unless you count changing exact error messages to be a breaking change).
This also avoids some panics. We do more try_reserve* stuff, and also remove some hopefully unreachable panics, such as:
- let labels = &mut extended_label_sets[sample.labels.to_raw_id()];+ let labels = extended_label_sets+ .get_mut(sample.labels.to_offset())+ .ok_or(ProfileDataError::InvalidLabelSetId)?;
It also extracts a helper function expand_label_set to fallibly convert a &LabelSet to a Vec<Label>, add endpoint info, and reserve the spare memory for the timestamp label which gets added later. (Note that it's added later because we have many observations with the same sets of labels, but the timestamp label will differ)
Motivation
We've also seen rare panics in some of the profiling FFI functions in crash reports. On Windows we don't have the panic message so I'm not exactly sure why. So I'm working on avoiding panics and ratcheting up the code quality so we have fewer failures all around.
Additionally, anyhow collects a call stack on failure and it's not cheap, plus it allocates for this. We don't want either.
Additional Notes
Some changes like moving constants are in preparation for another PR, but the changes are fine independent of that. This is also why changing the internal functions from anyhow to FfiSafeErrorMessage structs will help me: in that PR, we'll have ddog_prof_Profile_serialize2 which doesn't use anyhow, and reuses these internal helpers.
This report tracks Clippy allow annotations for specific rules, showing how they've changed in this PR. Decreasing the number of these annotations generally improves code quality.
⚠️12 issue(s) found, showing only errors (advisories, bans, sources)
📦 libdd-profiling-ffi - 6 error(s)
Show output
error[vulnerability]: NSEC3 closest-encloser proof validation enters unbounded loop on cross-zone responses
┌─ /home/runner/work/libdatadog/libdatadog/Cargo.lock:90:1
│
90 │ hickory-proto 0.25.2 registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index
│ ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━ security vulnerability detected
│
├ ID: RUSTSEC-2026-0118
├ Advisory: https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2026-0118
├ The NSEC3 closest-encloser proof validation in `hickory-proto`'s
`DnssecDnsHandle` walks from the QNAME up to the SOA owner name, building a
list of candidate encloser names. The iterator used assumes the
QNAME is a descendant of the SOA owner, terminating only when the current
candidate equals the SOA name. When the SOA in a response's authority section
is not an ancestor of the QNAME, the loop stalls at the DNS root and never
terminates, repeatedly calling `Name::base_name()` and pushing newly allocated
`Name` and hashed-name entries into the candidate `Vec`.
The bug is reachable by any caller of `DnssecDnsHandle` — including the
resolver, recursor, and client — when built with the `dnssec-ring` or
`dnssec-aws-lc-rs` feature and configured to perform DNSSEC validation. It is
triggered while validating a NoData or NXDomain response whose authority
section contains an SOA record from a zone other than an ancestor of the
QNAME, on a code path that requires NSEC3 closest-encloser proof. In practice
this can be reached through an insecure CNAME chain that crosses zone
boundaries into a DNSSEC-signed zone returning NoData, but the minimum
condition is just a mismatched SOA owner on a response requiring NSEC3
validation.
A `debug_assert_ne!(name, Name::root())` guards the loop body, so debug builds
abort with a panic on the first iteration past the root. Release builds
compile the assertion out and run the loop unbounded, allocating until the
process exhausts available memory (OOM). A reachable upstream attacker who
can return such a response can therefore crash a debug-built validator or
exhaust memory on a release-built one.
The affected code was migrated from `hickory-proto` to `hickory-net` as part of
the 0.26.0 release. The `hickory-proto` 0.26.x release no longer offers
`DnssecDnsHandle` and so we recommend all affected users update to `hickory-net`
0.26.1 when the implementation of that type is required.
├ Announcement: https://github.com/hickory-dns/hickory-dns/security/advisories/GHSA-3v94-mw7p-v465
├ Solution: No safe upgrade is available!
├ hickory-proto v0.25.2
└── hickory-resolver v0.25.2
└── reqwest v0.13.2
├── libdd-common v4.0.0
│ ├── libdd-common-ffi v33.0.0
│ │ └── libdd-profiling-ffi v1.0.0
│ ├── libdd-profiling v1.0.0
│ │ ├── (dev) libdd-profiling v1.0.0 (*)
│ │ └── libdd-profiling-ffi v1.0.0 (*)
│ └── libdd-profiling-ffi v1.0.0 (*)
└── libdd-profiling v1.0.0 (*)
error[vulnerability]: CPU exhaustion during message encoding due to O(n²) name compression
┌─ /home/runner/work/libdatadog/libdatadog/Cargo.lock:90:1
│
90 │ hickory-proto 0.25.2 registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index
│ ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━ security vulnerability detected
│
├ ID: RUSTSEC-2026-0119
├ Advisory: https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2026-0119
├ During message encoding, `hickory-proto`'s `BinEncoder` stores pointers to
labels that are candidates for name compression in a `Vec<(usize, Vec<u8>)>`.
The name compression logic then searches for matches with a linear scan.
A malicious message with many records can both introduce many candidate labels,
and invoke this linear scan many times. This can amplify CPU exhaustion in DoS
attacks.
This is similar to
[CVE-2024-8508](https://www.nlnetlabs.nl/downloads/unbound/CVE-2024-8508.txt).
We recommend all affected users update to `hickory-proto` 0.26.1 for the fix.
├ Announcement: https://github.com/hickory-dns/hickory-dns/security/advisories/GHSA-q2qq-hmj6-3wpp
├ Solution: Upgrade to >=0.26.1 (try `cargo update -p hickory-proto`)
├ hickory-proto v0.25.2
└── hickory-resolver v0.25.2
└── reqwest v0.13.2
├── libdd-common v4.0.0
│ ├── libdd-common-ffi v33.0.0
│ │ └── libdd-profiling-ffi v1.0.0
│ ├── libdd-profiling v1.0.0
│ │ ├── (dev) libdd-profiling v1.0.0 (*)
│ │ └── libdd-profiling-ffi v1.0.0 (*)
│ └── libdd-profiling-ffi v1.0.0 (*)
└── libdd-profiling v1.0.0 (*)
error[unsound]: Rand is unsound with a custom logger using `rand::rng()`
┌─ /home/runner/work/libdatadog/libdatadog/Cargo.lock:171:1
│
171 │ rand 0.8.5 registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index
│ ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━ unsound advisory detected
│
├ ID: RUSTSEC-2026-0097
├ Advisory: https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2026-0097
├ It has been reported (by @lopopolo) that the `rand` library is [unsound](https://rust-lang.github.io/unsafe-code-guidelines/glossary.html#soundness-of-code--of-a-library) (i.e. that safe code using the public API can cause Undefined Behaviour) when all the following conditions are met:
- The `log` and `thread_rng` features are enabled
- A [custom logger](https://docs.rs/log/latest/log/#implementing-a-logger) is defined
- The custom logger accesses `rand::rng()` (previously `rand::thread_rng()`) and calls any `TryRng` (previously `RngCore`) methods on `ThreadRng`
- The `ThreadRng` (attempts to) reseed while called from the custom logger (this happens every 64 kB of generated data)
- Trace-level logging is enabled or warn-level logging is enabled and the random source (the `getrandom` crate) is unable to provide a new seed
`TryRng` (previously `RngCore`) methods for `ThreadRng` use `unsafe` code to cast `*mut BlockRng<ReseedingCore>` to `&mut BlockRng<ReseedingCore>`. When all the above conditions are met this results in an aliased mutable reference, violating the Stacked Borrows rules. Miri is able to detect this violation in sample code. Since construction of [aliased mutable references is Undefined Behaviour](https://doc.rust-lang.org/stable/nomicon/references.html), the behaviour of optimized builds is hard to predict.
├ Announcement: https://github.com/rust-random/rand/pull/1763
├ Solution: Upgrade to >=0.10.1 OR <0.10.0, >=0.9.3 OR <0.9.0, >=0.8.6 (try `cargo update -p rand`)
├ rand v0.8.5
├── libdd-common v4.0.0
│ ├── libdd-common-ffi v33.0.0
│ │ └── libdd-profiling-ffi v1.0.0
│ ├── libdd-profiling v1.0.0
│ │ ├── (dev) libdd-profiling v1.0.0 (*)
│ │ └── libdd-profiling-ffi v1.0.0 (*)
│ └── libdd-profiling-ffi v1.0.0 (*)
├── libdd-profiling v1.0.0 (*)
└── proptest v1.5.0
└── (dev) libdd-profiling v1.0.0 (*)
error[vulnerability]: Name constraints for URI names were incorrectly accepted
┌─ /home/runner/work/libdatadog/libdatadog/Cargo.lock:195:1
│
195 │ rustls-webpki 0.103.10 registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index
│ ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━ security vulnerability detected
│
├ ID: RUSTSEC-2026-0098
├ Advisory: https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2026-0098
├ Name constraints for URI names were ignored and therefore accepted.
Note this library does not provide an API for asserting URI names, and URI name constraints are otherwise not implemented. URI name constraints are now rejected unconditionally.
Since name constraints are restrictions on otherwise properly-issued certificates, this bug is reachable only after signature verification and requires misissuance to exploit.
This vulnerability is identified as [GHSA-965h-392x-2mh5](https://github.com/rustls/webpki/security/advisories/GHSA-965h-392x-2mh5). Thank you to @1seal for the report.
├ Solution: Upgrade to >=0.103.12, <0.104.0-alpha.1 OR >=0.104.0-alpha.6 (try `cargo update -p rustls-webpki`)
├ rustls-webpki v0.103.10
├── rustls v0.23.37
│ ├── hyper-rustls v0.27.7
│ │ ├── libdd-common v4.0.0
│ │ │ ├── libdd-common-ffi v33.0.0
│ │ │ │ └── libdd-profiling-ffi v1.0.0
│ │ │ ├── libdd-profiling v1.0.0
│ │ │ │ ├── (dev) libdd-profiling v1.0.0 (*)
│ │ │ │ └── libdd-profiling-ffi v1.0.0 (*)
│ │ │ └── libdd-profiling-ffi v1.0.0 (*)
│ │ └── reqwest v0.13.2
│ │ ├── libdd-common v4.0.0 (*)
│ │ └── libdd-profiling v1.0.0 (*)
│ ├── libdd-common v4.0.0 (*)
│ ├── libdd-profiling v1.0.0 (*)
│ ├── reqwest v0.13.2 (*)
│ ├── rustls-platform-verifier v0.6.2
│ │ ├── libdd-profiling v1.0.0 (*)
│ │ └── reqwest v0.13.2 (*)
│ └── tokio-rustls v0.26.0
│ ├── hyper-rustls v0.27.7 (*)
│ ├── libdd-common v4.0.0 (*)
│ └── reqwest v0.13.2 (*)
└── rustls-platform-verifier v0.6.2 (*)
error[vulnerability]: Name constraints were accepted for certificates asserting a wildcard name
┌─ /home/runner/work/libdatadog/libdatadog/Cargo.lock:195:1
│
195 │ rustls-webpki 0.103.10 registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index
│ ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━ security vulnerability detected
│
├ ID: RUSTSEC-2026-0099
├ Advisory: https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2026-0099
├ Permitted subtree name constraints for DNS names were accepted for certificates asserting a wildcard name.
This was incorrect because, given a name constraint of `accept.example.com`, `*.example.com` could feasibly allow a name of `reject.example.com` which is outside the constraint.
This is very similar to [CVE-2025-61727](https://go.dev/issue/76442).
Since name constraints are restrictions on otherwise properly-issued certificates, this bug is reachable only after signature verification and requires misissuance to exploit.
This vulnerability is identified as [GHSA-xgp8-3hg3-c2mh](https://github.com/rustls/webpki/security/advisories/GHSA-xgp8-3hg3-c2mh). Thank you to @1seal for the report.
├ Solution: Upgrade to >=0.103.12, <0.104.0-alpha.1 OR >=0.104.0-alpha.6 (try `cargo update -p rustls-webpki`)
├ rustls-webpki v0.103.10
├── rustls v0.23.37
│ ├── hyper-rustls v0.27.7
│ │ ├── libdd-common v4.0.0
│ │ │ ├── libdd-common-ffi v33.0.0
│ │ │ │ └── libdd-profiling-ffi v1.0.0
│ │ │ ├── libdd-profiling v1.0.0
│ │ │ │ ├── (dev) libdd-profiling v1.0.0 (*)
│ │ │ │ └── libdd-profiling-ffi v1.0.0 (*)
│ │ │ └── libdd-profiling-ffi v1.0.0 (*)
│ │ └── reqwest v0.13.2
│ │ ├── libdd-common v4.0.0 (*)
│ │ └── libdd-profiling v1.0.0 (*)
│ ├── libdd-common v4.0.0 (*)
│ ├── libdd-profiling v1.0.0 (*)
│ ├── reqwest v0.13.2 (*)
│ ├── rustls-platform-verifier v0.6.2
│ │ ├── libdd-profiling v1.0.0 (*)
│ │ └── reqwest v0.13.2 (*)
│ └── tokio-rustls v0.26.0
│ ├── hyper-rustls v0.27.7 (*)
│ ├── libdd-common v4.0.0 (*)
│ └── reqwest v0.13.2 (*)
└── rustls-platform-verifier v0.6.2 (*)
error[vulnerability]: Reachable panic in certificate revocation list parsing
┌─ /home/runner/work/libdatadog/libdatadog/Cargo.lock:195:1
│
195 │ rustls-webpki 0.103.10 registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index
│ ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━ security vulnerability detected
│
├ ID: RUSTSEC-2026-0104
├ Advisory: https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2026-0104
├ A panic was reachable when parsing certificate revocation lists via [`BorrowedCertRevocationList::from_der`]
or [`OwnedCertRevocationList::from_der`]. This was the result of mishandling a syntactically valid empty
`BIT STRING` appearing in the `onlySomeReasons` element of a `IssuingDistributionPoint` CRL extension.
This panic is reachable prior to a CRL's signature being verified.
Applications that do not use CRLs are not affected.
Thank you to @tynus3 for the report.
├ Solution: Upgrade to >=0.103.13, <0.104.0-alpha.1 OR >=0.104.0-alpha.7 (try `cargo update -p rustls-webpki`)
├ rustls-webpki v0.103.10
├── rustls v0.23.37
│ ├── hyper-rustls v0.27.7
│ │ ├── libdd-common v4.0.0
│ │ │ ├── libdd-common-ffi v33.0.0
│ │ │ │ └── libdd-profiling-ffi v1.0.0
│ │ │ ├── libdd-profiling v1.0.0
│ │ │ │ ├── (dev) libdd-profiling v1.0.0 (*)
│ │ │ │ └── libdd-profiling-ffi v1.0.0 (*)
│ │ │ └── libdd-profiling-ffi v1.0.0 (*)
│ │ └── reqwest v0.13.2
│ │ ├── libdd-common v4.0.0 (*)
│ │ └── libdd-profiling v1.0.0 (*)
│ ├── libdd-common v4.0.0 (*)
│ ├── libdd-profiling v1.0.0 (*)
│ ├── reqwest v0.13.2 (*)
│ ├── rustls-platform-verifier v0.6.2
│ │ ├── libdd-profiling v1.0.0 (*)
│ │ └── reqwest v0.13.2 (*)
│ └── tokio-rustls v0.26.0
│ ├── hyper-rustls v0.27.7 (*)
│ ├── libdd-common v4.0.0 (*)
│ └── reqwest v0.13.2 (*)
└── rustls-platform-verifier v0.6.2 (*)
advisories FAILED, bans ok, sources ok
📦 libdd-profiling - 6 error(s)
Show output
error[vulnerability]: NSEC3 closest-encloser proof validation enters unbounded loop on cross-zone responses
┌─ /home/runner/work/libdatadog/libdatadog/Cargo.lock:79:1
│
79 │ hickory-proto 0.25.2 registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index
│ ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━ security vulnerability detected
│
├ ID: RUSTSEC-2026-0118
├ Advisory: https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2026-0118
├ The NSEC3 closest-encloser proof validation in `hickory-proto`'s
`DnssecDnsHandle` walks from the QNAME up to the SOA owner name, building a
list of candidate encloser names. The iterator used assumes the
QNAME is a descendant of the SOA owner, terminating only when the current
candidate equals the SOA name. When the SOA in a response's authority section
is not an ancestor of the QNAME, the loop stalls at the DNS root and never
terminates, repeatedly calling `Name::base_name()` and pushing newly allocated
`Name` and hashed-name entries into the candidate `Vec`.
The bug is reachable by any caller of `DnssecDnsHandle` — including the
resolver, recursor, and client — when built with the `dnssec-ring` or
`dnssec-aws-lc-rs` feature and configured to perform DNSSEC validation. It is
triggered while validating a NoData or NXDomain response whose authority
section contains an SOA record from a zone other than an ancestor of the
QNAME, on a code path that requires NSEC3 closest-encloser proof. In practice
this can be reached through an insecure CNAME chain that crosses zone
boundaries into a DNSSEC-signed zone returning NoData, but the minimum
condition is just a mismatched SOA owner on a response requiring NSEC3
validation.
A `debug_assert_ne!(name, Name::root())` guards the loop body, so debug builds
abort with a panic on the first iteration past the root. Release builds
compile the assertion out and run the loop unbounded, allocating until the
process exhausts available memory (OOM). A reachable upstream attacker who
can return such a response can therefore crash a debug-built validator or
exhaust memory on a release-built one.
The affected code was migrated from `hickory-proto` to `hickory-net` as part of
the 0.26.0 release. The `hickory-proto` 0.26.x release no longer offers
`DnssecDnsHandle` and so we recommend all affected users update to `hickory-net`
0.26.1 when the implementation of that type is required.
├ Announcement: https://github.com/hickory-dns/hickory-dns/security/advisories/GHSA-3v94-mw7p-v465
├ Solution: No safe upgrade is available!
├ hickory-proto v0.25.2
└── hickory-resolver v0.25.2
└── reqwest v0.13.2
├── libdd-common v4.0.0
│ └── libdd-profiling v1.0.0
│ └── (dev) libdd-profiling v1.0.0 (*)
└── libdd-profiling v1.0.0 (*)
error[vulnerability]: CPU exhaustion during message encoding due to O(n²) name compression
┌─ /home/runner/work/libdatadog/libdatadog/Cargo.lock:79:1
│
79 │ hickory-proto 0.25.2 registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index
│ ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━ security vulnerability detected
│
├ ID: RUSTSEC-2026-0119
├ Advisory: https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2026-0119
├ During message encoding, `hickory-proto`'s `BinEncoder` stores pointers to
labels that are candidates for name compression in a `Vec<(usize, Vec<u8>)>`.
The name compression logic then searches for matches with a linear scan.
A malicious message with many records can both introduce many candidate labels,
and invoke this linear scan many times. This can amplify CPU exhaustion in DoS
attacks.
This is similar to
[CVE-2024-8508](https://www.nlnetlabs.nl/downloads/unbound/CVE-2024-8508.txt).
We recommend all affected users update to `hickory-proto` 0.26.1 for the fix.
├ Announcement: https://github.com/hickory-dns/hickory-dns/security/advisories/GHSA-q2qq-hmj6-3wpp
├ Solution: Upgrade to >=0.26.1 (try `cargo update -p hickory-proto`)
├ hickory-proto v0.25.2
└── hickory-resolver v0.25.2
└── reqwest v0.13.2
├── libdd-common v4.0.0
│ └── libdd-profiling v1.0.0
│ └── (dev) libdd-profiling v1.0.0 (*)
└── libdd-profiling v1.0.0 (*)
error[unsound]: Rand is unsound with a custom logger using `rand::rng()`
┌─ /home/runner/work/libdatadog/libdatadog/Cargo.lock:157:1
│
157 │ rand 0.8.5 registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index
│ ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━ unsound advisory detected
│
├ ID: RUSTSEC-2026-0097
├ Advisory: https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2026-0097
├ It has been reported (by @lopopolo) that the `rand` library is [unsound](https://rust-lang.github.io/unsafe-code-guidelines/glossary.html#soundness-of-code--of-a-library) (i.e. that safe code using the public API can cause Undefined Behaviour) when all the following conditions are met:
- The `log` and `thread_rng` features are enabled
- A [custom logger](https://docs.rs/log/latest/log/#implementing-a-logger) is defined
- The custom logger accesses `rand::rng()` (previously `rand::thread_rng()`) and calls any `TryRng` (previously `RngCore`) methods on `ThreadRng`
- The `ThreadRng` (attempts to) reseed while called from the custom logger (this happens every 64 kB of generated data)
- Trace-level logging is enabled or warn-level logging is enabled and the random source (the `getrandom` crate) is unable to provide a new seed
`TryRng` (previously `RngCore`) methods for `ThreadRng` use `unsafe` code to cast `*mut BlockRng<ReseedingCore>` to `&mut BlockRng<ReseedingCore>`. When all the above conditions are met this results in an aliased mutable reference, violating the Stacked Borrows rules. Miri is able to detect this violation in sample code. Since construction of [aliased mutable references is Undefined Behaviour](https://doc.rust-lang.org/stable/nomicon/references.html), the behaviour of optimized builds is hard to predict.
├ Announcement: https://github.com/rust-random/rand/pull/1763
├ Solution: Upgrade to >=0.10.1 OR <0.10.0, >=0.9.3 OR <0.9.0, >=0.8.6 (try `cargo update -p rand`)
├ rand v0.8.5
├── libdd-common v4.0.0
│ └── libdd-profiling v1.0.0
│ └── (dev) libdd-profiling v1.0.0 (*)
├── libdd-profiling v1.0.0 (*)
└── proptest v1.5.0
└── (dev) libdd-profiling v1.0.0 (*)
error[vulnerability]: Name constraints for URI names were incorrectly accepted
┌─ /home/runner/work/libdatadog/libdatadog/Cargo.lock:181:1
│
181 │ rustls-webpki 0.103.10 registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index
│ ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━ security vulnerability detected
│
├ ID: RUSTSEC-2026-0098
├ Advisory: https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2026-0098
├ Name constraints for URI names were ignored and therefore accepted.
Note this library does not provide an API for asserting URI names, and URI name constraints are otherwise not implemented. URI name constraints are now rejected unconditionally.
Since name constraints are restrictions on otherwise properly-issued certificates, this bug is reachable only after signature verification and requires misissuance to exploit.
This vulnerability is identified as [GHSA-965h-392x-2mh5](https://github.com/rustls/webpki/security/advisories/GHSA-965h-392x-2mh5). Thank you to @1seal for the report.
├ Solution: Upgrade to >=0.103.12, <0.104.0-alpha.1 OR >=0.104.0-alpha.6 (try `cargo update -p rustls-webpki`)
├ rustls-webpki v0.103.10
├── rustls v0.23.37
│ ├── hyper-rustls v0.27.7
│ │ ├── libdd-common v4.0.0
│ │ │ └── libdd-profiling v1.0.0
│ │ │ └── (dev) libdd-profiling v1.0.0 (*)
│ │ └── reqwest v0.13.2
│ │ ├── libdd-common v4.0.0 (*)
│ │ └── libdd-profiling v1.0.0 (*)
│ ├── libdd-common v4.0.0 (*)
│ ├── libdd-profiling v1.0.0 (*)
│ ├── reqwest v0.13.2 (*)
│ ├── rustls-platform-verifier v0.6.2
│ │ ├── libdd-profiling v1.0.0 (*)
│ │ └── reqwest v0.13.2 (*)
│ └── tokio-rustls v0.26.0
│ ├── hyper-rustls v0.27.7 (*)
│ ├── libdd-common v4.0.0 (*)
│ └── reqwest v0.13.2 (*)
└── rustls-platform-verifier v0.6.2 (*)
error[vulnerability]: Name constraints were accepted for certificates asserting a wildcard name
┌─ /home/runner/work/libdatadog/libdatadog/Cargo.lock:181:1
│
181 │ rustls-webpki 0.103.10 registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index
│ ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━ security vulnerability detected
│
├ ID: RUSTSEC-2026-0099
├ Advisory: https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2026-0099
├ Permitted subtree name constraints for DNS names were accepted for certificates asserting a wildcard name.
This was incorrect because, given a name constraint of `accept.example.com`, `*.example.com` could feasibly allow a name of `reject.example.com` which is outside the constraint.
This is very similar to [CVE-2025-61727](https://go.dev/issue/76442).
Since name constraints are restrictions on otherwise properly-issued certificates, this bug is reachable only after signature verification and requires misissuance to exploit.
This vulnerability is identified as [GHSA-xgp8-3hg3-c2mh](https://github.com/rustls/webpki/security/advisories/GHSA-xgp8-3hg3-c2mh). Thank you to @1seal for the report.
├ Solution: Upgrade to >=0.103.12, <0.104.0-alpha.1 OR >=0.104.0-alpha.6 (try `cargo update -p rustls-webpki`)
├ rustls-webpki v0.103.10
├── rustls v0.23.37
│ ├── hyper-rustls v0.27.7
│ │ ├── libdd-common v4.0.0
│ │ │ └── libdd-profiling v1.0.0
│ │ │ └── (dev) libdd-profiling v1.0.0 (*)
│ │ └── reqwest v0.13.2
│ │ ├── libdd-common v4.0.0 (*)
│ │ └── libdd-profiling v1.0.0 (*)
│ ├── libdd-common v4.0.0 (*)
│ ├── libdd-profiling v1.0.0 (*)
│ ├── reqwest v0.13.2 (*)
│ ├── rustls-platform-verifier v0.6.2
│ │ ├── libdd-profiling v1.0.0 (*)
│ │ └── reqwest v0.13.2 (*)
│ └── tokio-rustls v0.26.0
│ ├── hyper-rustls v0.27.7 (*)
│ ├── libdd-common v4.0.0 (*)
│ └── reqwest v0.13.2 (*)
└── rustls-platform-verifier v0.6.2 (*)
error[vulnerability]: Reachable panic in certificate revocation list parsing
┌─ /home/runner/work/libdatadog/libdatadog/Cargo.lock:181:1
│
181 │ rustls-webpki 0.103.10 registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index
│ ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━ security vulnerability detected
│
├ ID: RUSTSEC-2026-0104
├ Advisory: https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2026-0104
├ A panic was reachable when parsing certificate revocation lists via [`BorrowedCertRevocationList::from_der`]
or [`OwnedCertRevocationList::from_der`]. This was the result of mishandling a syntactically valid empty
`BIT STRING` appearing in the `onlySomeReasons` element of a `IssuingDistributionPoint` CRL extension.
This panic is reachable prior to a CRL's signature being verified.
Applications that do not use CRLs are not affected.
Thank you to @tynus3 for the report.
├ Solution: Upgrade to >=0.103.13, <0.104.0-alpha.1 OR >=0.104.0-alpha.7 (try `cargo update -p rustls-webpki`)
├ rustls-webpki v0.103.10
├── rustls v0.23.37
│ ├── hyper-rustls v0.27.7
│ │ ├── libdd-common v4.0.0
│ │ │ └── libdd-profiling v1.0.0
│ │ │ └── (dev) libdd-profiling v1.0.0 (*)
│ │ └── reqwest v0.13.2
│ │ ├── libdd-common v4.0.0 (*)
│ │ └── libdd-profiling v1.0.0 (*)
│ ├── libdd-common v4.0.0 (*)
│ ├── libdd-profiling v1.0.0 (*)
│ ├── reqwest v0.13.2 (*)
│ ├── rustls-platform-verifier v0.6.2
│ │ ├── libdd-profiling v1.0.0 (*)
│ │ └── reqwest v0.13.2 (*)
│ └── tokio-rustls v0.26.0
│ ├── hyper-rustls v0.27.7 (*)
│ ├── libdd-common v4.0.0 (*)
│ └── reqwest v0.13.2 (*)
└── rustls-platform-verifier v0.6.2 (*)
advisories FAILED, bans ok, sources ok
❌ Patch coverage is 71.95122% with 23 lines in your changes missing coverage. Please review.
✅ Project coverage is 72.64%. Comparing base (0a3304c) to head (929e50f).
This file contains hidden or bidirectional Unicode text that may be interpreted or compiled differently than what appears below. To review, open the file in an editor that reveals hidden Unicode characters.
Learn more about bidirectional Unicode characters
Add this suggestion to a batch that can be applied as a single commit.This suggestion is invalid because no changes were made to the code.Suggestions cannot be applied while the pull request is closed.Suggestions cannot be applied while viewing a subset of changes.Only one suggestion per line can be applied in a batch.Add this suggestion to a batch that can be applied as a single commit.Applying suggestions on deleted lines is not supported.You must change the existing code in this line in order to create a valid suggestion.Outdated suggestions cannot be applied.This suggestion has been applied or marked resolved.Suggestions cannot be applied from pending reviews.Suggestions cannot be applied on multi-line comments.Suggestions cannot be applied while the pull request is queued to merge.Suggestion cannot be applied right now. Please check back later.
What does this PR do?
Mostly this introduces new Error structs instead of using anyhow for some internal operations (not public API changes, unless you count changing exact error messages to be a breaking change).
This also avoids some panics. We do more
try_reserve*stuff, and also remove some hopefully unreachable panics, such as:It also extracts a helper function
expand_label_setto fallibly convert a&LabelSetto aVec<Label>, add endpoint info, and reserve the spare memory for the timestamp label which gets added later. (Note that it's added later because we have many observations with the same sets of labels, but the timestamp label will differ)Motivation
We've also seen rare panics in some of the profiling FFI functions in crash reports. On Windows we don't have the panic message so I'm not exactly sure why. So I'm working on avoiding panics and ratcheting up the code quality so we have fewer failures all around.
Additionally, anyhow collects a call stack on failure and it's not cheap, plus it allocates for this. We don't want either.
Additional Notes
Some changes like moving constants are in preparation for another PR, but the changes are fine independent of that. This is also why changing the internal functions from anyhow to
FfiSafeErrorMessagestructs will help me: in that PR, we'll haveddog_prof_Profile_serialize2which doesn't useanyhow, and reuses these internal helpers.This is also blocked on #1988 merging first.
How to test the change?
Aside from the exact error messages displayed and possibly having fewer panics, this should test and act the same!