proof-of-concept(wallet): opt in to kv-store encryption-at-rest#18
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mverzilli wants to merge 1 commit intomartin/sqlite-opfs-wiringfrom
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proof-of-concept(wallet): opt in to kv-store encryption-at-rest#18mverzilli wants to merge 1 commit intomartin/sqlite-opfs-wiringfrom
mverzilli wants to merge 1 commit intomartin/sqlite-opfs-wiringfrom
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Wires the new AesGcmCipher from @aztec/kv-store/sqlite-opfs into the PXE + walletDB stores. A 32-byte master seed is generated once and persisted in localStorage under `aztec-kv-cipher-seed-v1`; subsequent loads reuse it so the encrypted OPFS data remains readable across reloads. Changes - walletService.ts: build a shared AesGcmCipher (RawKeyProvider over the persisted seed) and pass it to both AztecSQLiteOPFSStore.open calls. The wallet + PXE get the same HKDF-derived sub-keys. - walletService.ts: VITE_KV_ENCRYPT=0 (or "false") disables the cipher — useful for A/B diagnosis and as a safety escape hatch. Default is on. - walletService.ts: registerSqliteInspectors runs BEFORE EmbeddedWallet.create so the DevTools helpers are reachable even if wallet init hangs or throws. - sqliteInspector.ts: new peekEncryption() reports per-container valueEncrypted / keyLooksHmacd flags at a glance, so you can visually confirm the cipher is active and opaque-keys containers actually HMAC their keys on disk. Fixed summarize()'s reliance on SQLite's `rowid` — the data table is WITHOUT ROWID, so the old query syntax failed. Key provider caveat This is a dev-grade key source: the seed survives page reloads (localStorage) but not device loss or same-origin XSS. A proper IndexedDB-backed unextractable CryptoKey provider — or WebAuthn-PRF — is follow-up work. Validated end-to-end Ran a full swap + claim on testnet with encryption on, then confirmed via peekEncryption() that every audit-flagged container is HMAC'd (32-byte keys): map:notes, map:note_nullifiers_by_contract, map:note_block_number_to_nullifier, map:pending_indexes, map:last_finalized_indexes, map:highest_aged_index, map:highest_finalized_index, map:complete_address_index, map:accounts, map:account_aliases. All 22 populated containers show valueEncrypted: true. Depends on aztec-packages martin/sqlite-with-encryption-at-rest (PR AztecProtocol/aztec-packages#22683). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <[email protected]>
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Wires the new AesGcmCipher from @aztec/kv-store/sqlite-opfs into the PXE + walletDB stores. A 32-byte master seed is generated once and persisted in localStorage under
aztec-kv-cipher-seed-v1; subsequent loads reuse it so the encrypted OPFS data remains readable across reloads.Changes
rowid— the data table is WITHOUT ROWID, so the old query syntax failed.Key provider caveat
This is a dev-grade key source: the seed survives page reloads (localStorage) but not device loss or same-origin XSS. A proper IndexedDB-backed unextractable CryptoKey provider — or WebAuthn-PRF — is follow-up work.
Validated end-to-end
Ran a full swap + claim on testnet with encryption on, then confirmed via peekEncryption() that every audit-flagged container is HMAC'd (32-byte keys): map:notes, map:note_nullifiers_by_contract, map:note_block_number_to_nullifier, map:pending_indexes, map:last_finalized_indexes, map:highest_aged_index, map:highest_finalized_index, map:complete_address_index, map:accounts, map:account_aliases. All 22 populated containers show valueEncrypted: true.
Depends on aztec-packages martin/sqlite-with-encryption-at-rest (PR AztecProtocol/aztec-packages#22683).