The crosswalk's llm-top10/ mappings now target the
OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications 2026.
Every entry kept its subject matter, but eight of the ten changed number and two
changed name and scope. This file is the map: use it to rewrite references in
your own policies, findings, dashboards, and CI configuration.
Nothing here changes the Agentic Top 10 (ASI) or DSGAI 2026 entries. Their IDs are unchanged; only their cross-references to LLM entries were renumbered.
| 2025 ID | 2025 name | → | 2026 ID | 2026 name | Movement |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| LLM01 | Prompt Injection | → | LLM01 | Prompt Injection | Steady |
| LLM02 | Sensitive Information Disclosure | → | LLM02 | Sensitive Information Disclosure | Steady |
| LLM06 | Excessive Agency | → | LLM03 | Excessive Agency | ▲ 3 places |
| LLM03 | Supply Chain Vulnerabilities | → | LLM04 | Supply Chain | ▼ 1 place, renamed |
| LLM04 | Data and Model Poisoning | → | LLM05 | Data and Model Poisoning | ▼ 1 place |
| LLM10 | Unbounded Consumption | → | LLM06 | Unbounded Consumption | ▲ 4 places |
| LLM09 | Misinformation | → | LLM07 | Misinformation | ▲ 2 places |
| LLM07 | System Prompt Leakage | → | LLM08 | Hidden Context Exposure | ▼ 1 place, re-scoped |
| LLM08 | Vector and Embedding Weaknesses | → | LLM09 | Vector and Embedding Weaknesses | ▼ 1 place |
| LLM05 | Insecure Output Handling | → | LLM10 | Improper Output Handling | ▼ 5 places, renamed |
LLM01→LLM01 · LLM02→LLM02 · LLM03→LLM04 · LLM04→LLM05 · LLM05→LLM10 · LLM06→LLM03 · LLM07→LLM08 · LLM08→LLM09 · LLM09→LLM07 · LLM10→LLM06
LLM08 — System Prompt Leakage → Hidden Context Exposure
The broadest change on the list. The 2026 entry covers the extraction, inference, or reconstruction of any non-user-facing context the application assembles into the model's context window — the system prompt, developer instructions, retrieved policy text, and the tool and function schemas exposed to the model — not just the system prompt.
Severity tracks what that context holds: internal rules and workflow logic are medium, embedded credentials or reliance on context secrecy for authorisation are high, and disclosure that chains to code execution or broad exfiltration is critical. The design principle is that hidden context is discoverable and is never a security boundary.
Renamed, and widened to cover the insecure code that coding assistants generate at scale. Output that reaches a compiler, a repository, or a production system carries the same downstream-execution risk as output that reaches a shell, a browser, or a database.
| Entry | Absorbed in 2026 |
|---|---|
| LLM01 Prompt Injection | Cross-modal attacks — instructions hidden in image, audio, or video content |
| LLM04 Supply Chain | Artifact provenance — unsigned weights, hijacked conversion/merge services, model namespace reuse |
| LLM05 Data and Model Poisoning | Fine-tuning subversion — backdoored adapters, customer fine-tunes, distilled checkpoints |
| LLM10 Improper Output Handling | Insecure generated code reaching compilers, repositories, and production |
Three entries moved severity. Each change follows the rank movement the 2026 list published, and its rationale in the OWASP project leads' preface. See RATIONALE.md § 4.5 for the full justification.
| Entry | 2025 | 2026 | Basis |
|---|---|---|---|
| LLM03 Excessive Agency | High | Critical | Climbed to third, the largest move on the list; vote and incident record agree that agentic deployments are where damage lands |
| LLM06 Unbounded Consumption | Medium | High | Rose four places on practitioner weighting of resource and cost exhaustion |
| LLM07 Misinformation | Medium | High | Widest vote-versus-evidence gap on the list, with the incident record placing it near the top |
The other seven entries kept their 2025 severity.
- Findings and risk registers — rewrite entry IDs using the map above. Eight of ten change, and five of the changes are a permutation, so a naive find-and-replace run in ID order will corrupt them. Substitute all IDs in one pass, or map by entry name.
- CI eval configuration — the garak profiles under
evals/garak/were renamed to the 2026 numbering. See the table in evals/README.md. - Dashboards and queries —
source_listindata/entries/*.jsonis nowLLM-Top10-2026. Anything filtering onLLM-Top10-2025returns nothing. - Scope boundary — the 2026 list draws a sharper line: it owns the risk while the model is a component inside your application. Once the model becomes an actor, with tools it can call and memory it carries between sessions, pair the entry with the OWASP Agentic Top 10.
Three framework files carried entries from the 2023 list that earlier updates had missed. They were reconciled to the 2026 list as part of this work:
| File | Problem | Resolution |
|---|---|---|
llm-top10/LLM_DORA.md |
Carried both Model DoS (2023) and Unbounded Consumption; Training Data Poisoning (2023) in place of Data and Model Poisoning; no output-handling entry |
Dropped the stale Model DoS duplicate, folded Training Data Poisoning into LLM05, authored LLM10 |
llm-top10/LLM_FedRAMP.md |
Same three problems | Same resolution |
llm-top10/LLM_SP800218A.md |
Same duplication, plus no Sensitive Information Disclosure entry |
Dropped the stale duplicate, folded Training Data Poisoning into LLM05, authored LLM02 |
Their quick-reference tables were keyed to the pre-2025 numbering, so each file was remapped by entry name rather than by ID.
Part of the OWASP GenAI Crosswalk — maintained by the OWASP GenAI Data Security Initiative