diff --git a/java/jenkins/crypto/bcrypt-truncated-password.yaml b/java/jenkins/crypto/bcrypt-truncated-password.yaml
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..520fce7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/java/jenkins/crypto/bcrypt-truncated-password.yaml
@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+rules:
+  - id: codevigilant.java.jenkins.crypto.bcrypt-truncated-password
+    message: >-
+      A password byte array is truncated to 72 bytes (Arrays.copyOfRange(..., 0,
+      72) or a BCRYPT/MAX_LENGTH constant) before being hashed or compared with
+      BCrypt. BCrypt only uses the first 72 bytes of the input, so truncating
+      first makes every password that shares its first 72 bytes equivalent
+      (password-equivalence) and silently weakens long credentials. Hash or
+      compare the full password and let the library apply its own limit, or
+      pre-hash long passwords with a fast digest (e.g. SHA-256) before BCrypt.
+    severity: HIGH
+    languages: [java]
+    patterns:
+      - pattern: Arrays.copyOfRange($BYTES, 0, $LEN)
+      - metavariable-regex:
+          metavariable: $LEN
+          regex: '^(72|.*MAX_LENGTH.*|.*BCRYPT.*)$'
+    metadata:
+      category: security
+      cwe: "CWE-916: Use of Password Hash With Insufficient Computational Effort"
+      owasp: "A02:2021 - Cryptographic Failures"
+      technology:
+        - jenkins
+        - java
+        - crypto
+      confidence: MEDIUM
+      references:
+        - https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Password_Storage_Cheat_Sheet.html
+        - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bcrypt
+      source: ai-anant
+      license: MIT
diff --git a/java/jenkins/file-operation/filepath-copyfrom-url.yaml b/java/jenkins/file-operation/filepath-copyfrom-url.yaml
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0f50708
--- /dev/null
+++ b/java/jenkins/file-operation/filepath-copyfrom-url.yaml
@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+rules:
+  - id: codevigilant.java.jenkins.file-operation.filepath.copyfrom-url
+    patterns:
+      - pattern: $FP.copyFrom($URL)
+      - metavariable-pattern:
+          metavariable: $URL
+          patterns:
+            - pattern-either:
+                - pattern: new URL(...)
+                - pattern: (URL $U)
+      - pattern-not: $FP.copyFrom(new URL("..."))
+    message: |
+      Detected hudson.FilePath.copyFrom called with a non-literal URL.
+      copyFrom(URL) opens an outbound connection to the given URL and writes
+      the response body into the FilePath on the local node. In Jenkins
+      plugins the URL frequently originates from a remote server response
+      (report/download links), job configuration or build parameters expanded
+      at runtime. An attacker who can influence the resolved value can make
+      the agent/controller fetch arbitrary internal or external URLs
+      (server-side request forgery) and can steer the fetched content into an
+      attacker-chosen destination path, enabling arbitrary file writes on the
+      node. When the URL is not fully trusted, validate its scheme and host
+      against an allow-list, add connect/read timeouts, and constrain the
+      destination with FilePath.child(...) plus an isDescendant containment
+      check before fetching.
+    metadata:
+      category: security
+      cwe: "CWE-918: Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)"
+      owasp: "A10:2021 - Server-Side Request Forgery"
+      technology: jenkins
+      confidence: MEDIUM
+      references:
+        - https://www.jenkins.io/doc/developer/security/#server-side-request-forgery-ssrf
+        - https://owasp.org/www-community/attacks/Server_Side_Request_Forgery
+      source: independent security review
+      license: MIT
+    languages: [java]
+    mode: search
+    severity: HIGH
diff --git a/testcases/java/filepath-tainted-path-neg.java b/testcases/java/filepath-tainted-path-neg.java
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f8c70a9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/testcases/java/filepath-tainted-path-neg.java
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+import hudson.FilePath;
+import hudson.remoting.VirtualChannel;
+import java.net.URL;
+
+// Negative: literal URLs, FilePath-to-FilePath copies and child()-derived paths -> must NOT fire
+public class FilePathLiteralRepro {
+    public void safe(FilePath workspace, VirtualChannel channel, FilePath other) throws Exception {
+        FilePath literal = new FilePath(channel, "/var/lib/jenkins/workspace");
+        FilePath child = workspace.child("report.html");
+        literal.copyFrom(new URL("https://acunetix.example/reports/1.html"));
+        child.copyFrom(other); // FilePath-to-FilePath copy, not a URL fetch
+    }
+}
diff --git a/testcases/java/filepath-tainted-path-pos.java b/testcases/java/filepath-tainted-path-pos.java
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..73ef919
--- /dev/null
+++ b/testcases/java/filepath-tainted-path-pos.java
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+import hudson.FilePath;
+import hudson.remoting.VirtualChannel;
+import java.net.URL;
+
+// Positive: copyFrom fed a non-literal URL (remote-controlled download link),
+// fetched into a path built by string concatenation. Must fire on the copyFrom sink.
+public class FilePathTaintedRepro {
+    public void saveReport(FilePath workspace, VirtualChannel channel, String reportName, String urlSource) throws Exception {
+        URL url = new URL(urlSource);
+        FilePath reportFile = new FilePath(channel, workspace.getRemote() + "/" + reportName);
+        reportFile.copyFrom(url);
+    }
+}