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TODO.md

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sbx TODO

Features discussed but not yet implemented.

System scope and services

Containerize system services, e.g. those installed by .deb packages, the same way as desktop software and development projects.

Scopes and search path

Look up containers, templates, images and local.yml in the user's directories, then /etc/sbx (admin), then $SBX_LIB (vendor, e.g. /usr/lib/sbx for packages). A file earlier in the path shadows a later one, an override can import the shadowed file by path. System scope homes in /var/lib/sbx/containers/<name>, via StateDirectory= for units with User=. Machine defaults, e.g. a proxy, in /etc/sbx/local.yml.

Single file containers and templates

<name>.yml next to <name>/config.yml, for the latter when scripts are shipped. Packages drop /usr/lib/sbx/containers/<name>.yml and use ExecStart=/usr/bin/sbx run <name> in their unit.

Service support

sd_notify, binding NOTIFY_SOCKET, and socket activation, passing LISTEN_FDS, where LISTEN_PID does not match inside a PID namespace. Verify what bwrap leaves root without a user namespace, refuse root or drop all capabilities until then. listen-port with addresses, e.g. 0.0.0.0/443.

Security primitives

cwd blacklist

Refuse to run a sandbox whose cwd is bound from a sensitive host path. Override with --force-cwd. Wrinkle: cwd handling is a property of the bind action (cwd: true), not a top-level concept. The check belongs inside action_bind when cwd: true is set. Must realpath-resolve before comparing to the blacklist, and must catch ancestry (cwd inside a blacklisted dir, not just exact match).

Default blacklist: $HOME, $HOME/.ssh, $HOME/.gnupg, $HOME/.aws, $HOME/.config, $HOME/.local, $HOME/Documents, $HOME/Desktop, $HOME/Downloads, /, /etc, /root.

Network domain allowlist

Restrict a sandbox's internet access to listed domains, via a proxy.

Wayland socket filtering

Create a security-context-v1 socket per sandbox so wlroots compositors hide privileged protocols (virtual-keyboard, wlr-screencopy, wlr-data-control, foreign-toplevel). Needs a small Wayland client. With a nested X server, e.g. Xwayland per sandbox, X11 applications would be isolated by construction rather than by sbx-x11's filtering.

sbx-x11 extension resources

Requests of allowed extensions are checked against known opcodes, but not all check that the resources they change are the sandbox's, e.g. RENDER FreePicture, XFIXES DestroyRegion, SYNC SetCounter.

sbx-x11 follow-ups

Performance, measured with x11perf on Intel Iris Xe:

Test (per second) Direct sbx-x11 Two chained
PutImage 500x500 9,390 2,570
ShmPutImage 500x500 13,900 3,630 3,090
GetProperty 36,200 21,900
NoOperation 3.2 M

x11perf syncs each image with a 1 pixel GetImage, so these are round trip bound. Profiling shows the proxy mostly idle in epoll, so the cost is wake up latency per hop, ~18 µs per round trip, ~60 µs when the server is busy between requests. Open: the direct numbers were taken on the host, outside any sandbox, and a first hop appears to cost ~190 µs. Compare with x11-trusted in a sandbox to separate proxy and sandbox costs. A C or Rust rewrite would cut processing, not wake ups.

Screen contents under a sandbox window, unpainted (background None) or overlapped by another window, are readable without a compositing manager. Fix: track which drawables are windows and deny reading windows into readable drawables, e.g. GetImage, CopyArea to a pixmap, RENDER sources.

Other: check PointerRoot focus. NV-GLX is opaque and passed unfiltered. Offline tests: tests/sbx-x11.

readonly-overlay action

Bind a host path read-only with a writable tmpfs upper layer. Writes go to the overlay and are discarded on sandbox exit. Solves vscode extensions, npm cache poisoning, pip cache poisoning, language server binaries. bwrap supports this via --overlay-src / --overlay.

Rules library

Credential rules

Selective auth binds, one rule per tool. Each binds only the credential file(s) that tool needs, nothing else.

  • claude-creds - ~/.claude/.credentials.json
  • gh-creds - ~/.config/gh/hosts.yml
  • npm-creds - ~/.npmrc
  • pip-creds - ~/.pypirc
  • aws-creds - ~/.aws/credentials, ~/.aws/config
  • cargo-creds - ~/.cargo/credentials.toml

vscode-shared rule

Shared read-only ~/.vscode/extensions via --extensions-dir, per-sandbox writable --user-data-dir under $SANDBOX_HOME/.vscode-user. Avoids re-installing extensions per sandbox.

Shared cache rules

Read-only binds of ~/.npm, ~/.cache/pip, ~/.cargo/registry. Reduces repeated downloads. Consider readonly-overlay variants for cases where the tool needs to think it can write.

Host-side

sbx install-shims / uninstall-shims

Drop symlinks in ~/.local/bin/sbx-shims/ named after blocked tools (npm, npx, pip, pip3, pipx, node, cargo, code, etc). Each symlink points to the sbx binary itself.

sbx detects shim mode via os.path.basename(os.path.dirname(sys.argv[0])) == 'shims'. In shim mode:

  • If SANDBOX env var is set (already inside a sandbox), find the real binary via which -a excluding the shim dir and exec it.
  • Otherwise, refuse with a message suggesting sbx run. Honor SBX_BYPASS=1 as an escape hatch that execs the real binary.

Tool list configurable in ~/.config/sbx/shims.yml.

Worktree workflow

Worktree pre-hook (not a built-in action)

A template ships a pre-hook script that creates a git worktree, and a delete-hook (or post-hook) that removes it. Verify the existing hook support is sufficient for this; if not, fix it.

This is the claude-worktree template that motivates parallel Claude sessions on one repo. Worth building and shipping as a reference template once the security primitives are in place.

Other

Shared credential access via pre-hook

The general pattern: pre-hook copies/decrypts credentials from a host vault (pass, 1password, plain file, whatever) into $SANDBOX_HOME before bwrap starts. No sbx changes needed - just document the pattern with examples.